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QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
Whether the Petition for a Writ of Certiorari was timely 
filed and whether this Court has jurisdiction over the Petition. 
Whether Petitioner Young Electric Sign Company may raise 
issues for the first time in a Petition for a Writ of 
Certiorari. 
Whether there is any special or important reason why this 
case should be entitled to two levels of appellate review. 
REFERENCE TO OFFICIAL REPORT OF OPINION 
ISSUED BY THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Pickhover v. Smith's Management Corp., 106 Utah Adv. Rptr. 
43 (April 11, 1989). 
STATEMENT OF LACK OF JURISDICTIONAL GROUNDS 
1. Date of entry of decision sought to be reviewed: 
April 11, 1989. 
2. Date of entry of any order granting an extension of 
time in which to petition for writ of certiorari: May 11, 
1989. However, as is fully argued at Point I below, the 
extension was improvidently granted, as Rule 45(e) allows 
extension of the time for filing a petition only upon a showing 
of excusable neglect or good cause, neither of which was shown 
by Petitioner. 
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NO DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS 
Respondent agrees with Petitioner's statement that there 
appear to be no controlling provisions of constitutions, 
statutes, ordinances, or other regulations. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Respondent Marveon adopts Petitioner Young's Statement of 
the Case. Respondent Marveon points out that the Rule 54(b) 
Certification of the trial judge's granting of defendant/ 
Respondent Marveon*s Motion for Summary on Marveon's Cross-
Claim against defendant/appellant/Petitioner Young came well 
before the trial below, and came at the insistence of 
Petitioner. Petitioner Young's "Record on Appeal" is, there-
fore, fixed at the time of the Rule 54(b) Certification. Lane 
v. Messer, 689 P.2d 1333, 1334 (Utah 1984) (Appeal of Rule 
54(b) final judgment "only brings before [the appellate court] 
that portion of the action with respect to which the judgment 
has been entered"). Where Petitioner Young sought and obtained 
a Rule 54(b) Certification at the time of the summary judgment, 
Young cannot now use subsequent events at trial as a factual or 




THE PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI WAS NOT 
TIMELY FILED AND THIS COURT LACKS JURISDIC-
TION OVER THE PETITION 
The date of entry of the decision by the Court of Appeals 
that Petitioner now seeks to have reviewed was April 11, 1989. 
Rule 45(a), Rules of the Utah Supreme Court, provides that a 
petition for a writ of certiorari "must be filed . . . within 
30 days after entry of the decision by the Court of Appeals." 
The Petition was, therefore, due not later than May 11, 1989. 
On May 11, 1989, Petitioner obtained an Order granting an 
extension. The Order, however, was improvidently granted. 
Rule 45(e) specifically governs extensions of time for 
petitions for writ of certiorari, and specifically requires "a 
showing of excusable neglect or good cause" for any such 
extension. Petitioner failed not only to show either excusable 
neglect or good cause, but failed even to attempt such a 
showing.1 
Petitioner's Ex Parte Request for Extension, a copy of 
which appears in the Appendix as Exhibit "G," states, in full, 
as follows: 
•^Nor can Petitioner take any comfort in Rules 22 or 26(a), 
because Petitioner completely failed to comply with them. 
-3-
COMES NOW the defendant and petitioner Young 
Electric Sign Company pursuant to Rule 45(e) Rules of 
the Utah Supreme Court and requests this Court for an 
order extending the time to file its Petition for 
Certiorari to and including June 12, 1989. 
In utter disregard of the requirements of Rule 45(e), and 
without any attempt to show excusable neglect or cause, let 
alone good cause, Petitioner simply sought, ex parte, to double 
the prescribed time. Sound reasoning underlies Rule 45(e). By 
the time of a petition for writ of certiorari, a case already 
has had full appellate review. The parties need finality, and 
the balance is tipped in favor of finality. It is then up to a 
petitioner to show a special reason that a case should not be 
final, and Rule 45(e) requires a petitioner to do so in a 
timely fashion. In this case, Young made no effort to show 
either excusable neglect or good cause for an extension. 
Young's Petition is untimely, and the Court lacks jurisdiction 
over it. Young's Petition should be dismissed. 
POINT II 
THE ONLY ISSUE LITIGATED BELOW AND RAISED ON 
APPEAL WAS WHETHER THE LANGUAGE OF THE 
PURCHASE AGREEMENT IS SUFFICIENT TO REQUIRE 
YOUNG TO INDEMNIFY AND/OR INSURE MARVEON, 
AND YOUNG MAY NOT NOW RAISE ANY OTHER ISSUES. 
Young's Docketing Statement, a copy of which is found in 
the Appendix at Exhibit "H," states, at page 4: 
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ISSUE FOR REVIEW 
The defendant Young Electric Sign Company brings the 
following issue for review in this appeal. . . . 
Whether the language of the Purchase Agreement . . . 
is sufficient to require defendant Young to indemnify 
and/or insure Marveon. . . . 
Young's Brief on Appeal, filed with this Court on October 
14, 1987, prior to this Court "pouring the case over" to the 
Court of Appeals, states, at the page (unnumbered) following 
the Table of Authorities: 
ISSUES (SIC) PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
Whether the language of the Purchase Agreement . . . 
between Marveon and Young . . . was sufficient to 
require the defendant Young . . . to indemnify and/or 
insure Marveon . . . 
For the very first time Young now attempts to raise the 
issue of whether indemnification is the proper measure of 
damages. This issue was never before raised by Young at either 
the trial or appellate court levels. 
The issue of whether Young had a duty to Marveon under the 
terms of the Purchase Agreement also was not raised by Young 
below. Young's Memorandum in Opposition to Marveon's Motion 
for Summary Judgment is found at Exhibit "C" of the Appendix. 
Nowhere does it raise this issue, even tangentially, and 
neither do Young's Docketing Statement nor Young's Statement of 
the Issues Presented for Review. 
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As of February, 1989, Utah appellate courts had held at 
least 2117 times, including 18 times within the previous year, 
that issues may not be raised for the first time on appeal, but 
rather must be fully raised and litigated below. For example, 
in Ortiz v. Industrial Commission, 766 P.2d 1092 (Utah App. 
1989) (Davidson, Bench and Greenwood, JJ.), Ortiz argued on 
appeal that he was forced to use a letter of a doctor rather 
than the doctor's testimony. The Court flatly rejected the 
argument, stating, "[W]e will not consider an issue raised for 
the first time on appeal." Xd. at 1094. 
In Western Surety Co. v. Murphy, 754 P.2d 1237 (Utah App. 
1988) (Greenwood, Orme and Billings, JJ.), Western Surety 
argued on appeal that summary judgment below was inappropriately 
granted because a genuine issue of material fact existed 
regarding whether damages should be offset by the value of the 
vehicle in question without title. The Court flatly rejected 
Western Surety's attempt, stating: 
Issues that are not raised before the trial court may 
not be raised for the first time on appeal. . . . The 
issue of whether Curran's damages should be offset by 
the value of the car without title was not raised 
before the trial court. Therefore, this court will 
not consider the issue on appeal. 
Id. at 1240 (footnote and citations omitted). 
In this case, Young now tries to raise issues that were not 
raised below, were not litigated below, and were not preserved 
as issues on appeal. 
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POINT III 
THERE IS NO SPECIAL OR IMPORTANT REASON FOR 
REVIEW OF THIS CASE BY WRIT OF CERTIORARI. 
This case is an ordinary, run-of-the-mill claim by one 
defendant, Marveon, against another defendant, Young, based on 
a contract between the two defendants. The appellant/Petitioner 
Young has been ruled against by the trial judge, after Young 
fully briefed and argued its case, and by the Court of Appeals, 
after appellant/Petitioner Young fully briefed and argued its 
appeal. 
In seeking a second bite at the appellate apple, Petitioner 
has demonstrated only that it can recite the "buzzwords" for 
the standards for a petition. The facts simply do not support 
Petitioner's conclusory rhetoric that "the Court of Appeals has 
rendered a decision which has sanctioned the departure by the 
trial court from the accepted and usual course of judicial 
proceedings," that "the decision of the Court of Appeals is in 
conflict with prior decisions of this Court," and that "the 
questions presented for review are important enough that they 
should be settled by this Court." None of these rationale 
applies. The trial judge simply enforced a contract, and the 
Court of Appeals correctly affirmed the trial judge. When it 
comes to the substance of the actual case, Petitioner has 
failed to show how the standards for a petition are met by the 
facts. Petitioner took double the allotted time for filing the 
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Petition, and now remains unable to state a single cogent 
reason why the case is so special that it should not be final. 
If all litigants, who are dissatisfied with a decision of a 
trial judge and the Court of Appeals' affirmance of the trial 
judge were allowed a second review by this Court, there would 
be no reason to have a Court of Appeals; direct appeal to this 
Court would be preferable. This case has run its full course, 
and petitioner's Petition should be denied. 
A. The Trial Judge Simply Enforced the Contract—The Purchase 
Agreement Clearly and Unambiguously Expresses The Intention 
That The Purchaser Of The sign (Petitioner Young) Agreed To 
"Fully Protect" The Seller Of The Sign (Respondent Marveon) 
Against Personal Injury Or Death Claims Arising Out Of The 
Sign. 
By Section 2.a. of the Purchase Agreement, Young unambigu-
ously agreed "to provide, at [Young's] expense, insurance 
coverage adequate to fully protect [Marveon] against . . . 
personal injury or death claims arising out of the ownership, 
maintenance, use, service . . . or installation of" the sign. 
The stale arguments about who agreed to indemnify whom for 
whose negligence are irrelevant. The issue is not whether one 
party agreed to indemnify another party for only the first 
party's negligence, for only the second party's negligence, or 
for both the first party and the second party's negligence. On 
the contrary, Young specifically agreed to provide insurance 
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coverage adequate to fully protect Marveon against personal 
injury or death claims up to $1,000,000, regardless of whose 
negligence caused the claim. Assuming, arguendo, that the 
death arose out of the original installation in 1978, as 
opposed to the reinstallation by Young in 1982, which Marveon 
vehemently denies, Young, through the Purchase Agreement of 
1981, nevertheless agreed to provide insurance coverage 
adequate to fully protect Marveon against death claims arising 
out of the ownership, maintenance, use, service, or 
installation of the sign. 
Viewed in the commercial context of the Purchase Agreement, 
this provision makes eminent good sense. Marveon was going out 
of the sign business. Young was taking over Marveon's pre-
established business. Marveon was not interested in litigating, 
five to ten years down the line, about whether a claim arose 
out of the sole negligence of Young, the sole negligence of 
Marveon, or the combined negligence of Young and Marveon. 
Marveon wanted insurance coverage that would fully protect it 
against claims for personal injury or death arising out of the 
signs, regardless of the apportionment of fault. That is what 
Marveon bargained for; that is what Young agreed to do. The 
Purchase Agreement is clear and unambiguous on its face. 
Young unequivocally agreed to provide insurance coverage 
adequate to fully protect Marveon against personal injury or 
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death claims arising out of the ownership, maintenance, use, 
service, or installation of signs. This case clearly arises 
out of the ownership, maintenance, use, service or installation 
of signs. The trial judge simply enforced the contract, and 
the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial judge. 
B. The Purchase Agreement Between Marveon And Young Must Be 
Read As A Whole. Young's Arguments Would Effectively Write 
Paragraph 2.a., The Paragraph Whereby Young Agreed to 
Provide Insurance Adequate To "Fully Protect" Marveon, Out 
Of The Purchase Agreement. 
Young claims that the language in paragraph 20.c. of the 
Purchase Agreement that Marveon "has performed in all material 
respects all obligations . . . and is not in default in any 
material respect" somehow voids Young's promise in paragraph 
2.a. to provide insurance coverage adequate to fully protect 
Marveon. Such a construction effectively writes paragraph 2.a. 
out of the Purchase Agreement. If, as Young argues, a personal 
injury or death arising out of a sign Marveon had installed 
meant that Marveon had not fully performed in all material 
respects, or that Marveon was somehow in default in a material 
respect, there could be no possible circumstances ever to arise 
that would give any meaning to the provision of paragraph 2.a. 
whereby Young agreed to provide insurance coverage adequate to 
fully protect Marveon. If there were never an injury or death, 
there would never be a need for insurance; but, according to 
Young, if there ever were an injury or death, the fact of any 
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injury or death means Marveon has not performed and is in 
default, thus voiding paragraph 2.a and making its inclusion in 
the contract nonsensical. 
Young claims that without the representation that Marveon 
had performed and was not in default, Young would never have 
agreed to provide the insurance coverage adequate to fully 
protect Marveon. Again, however, the argument fails logically. 
Had Marveon and Young known that no one would ever file a suit 
against Marveon, there would have been no reason for paragraph 
2.a. The only way the two provisions of the Purchase Agreement 
can be interpreted harmoniously is that, as far as Marveon knew 
at the time of the Purchase Agreement, Marveon had performed in 
all material respects and was not in default in any material 
respect. There is no evidence, and no claim has been made, 
that as of the time of the Purchase Agreement, Marveon knew of 
any problem with the sign out of which this lawsuit arises. 
Even more fundamentally, paragraph 20 is simply not applic-
able to this case. Paragraph 20 clearly refers to "contracts" 
and "defaults." Paragraph 20.c. states: "Except as provided in 
Schedule L, [Marveon] is not a party to any contract adversely 
affecting assets being purchased or contracts been assumed." 
The language Young relies on is simply language clarifying and 
explaining this introductory sentence of paragraph 20.c. Para-
graph 20 does not refer to personal injury lawsuits or deaths. 
Paragraph 2.a. is the paragraph that addresses personal 
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injuries, deaths, and lawsuits arising therefrom, and is the 
paragraph that controls this case. 
C. All Other Utah Indemnification Cases Are Different Than 
This Case. All Other Cases Arose Either In The Context Of 
An Employer Losing The Exclusive Remedy Provision Of Work-
men's Compensation If The Indemnification Agreement Were 
Upheld, Or Cases Where The Indemnitee Took Advantage Of 
Great Disparity In Economic Power To Force The Indemnitor 
Into The Indemnification Agreement In The First Place. 
Utah law is clear that: 
where the intention to indemnify a person from losses 
attributable to his own negligence is "clearly and 
unc^quivocally expressed" in the contract language, an 
indemnity agreement will be upheld. 
Shell Oil v. Brinkerhoff Signal Drilling Co., 658 P.2d 1187, 
1189 (Utah 1983). The Purchase Agreement in this case clearly 
and uneguivocally expresses an intention to indemnify Marveon 
against Marveon's own negligence. 
In Shell Oil Co. v. Brinkerhoff Signal Drilling Co., 658 
P.2d 1187 (Utah 1983), Brinkerhoff, an independent contractor 
drilling oil wells for Shell, had entered into an indemnifica-
tion agreement with Shell that provided: 
[Brinkerhoff] agrees to protect, indemnify and 
save . . . [Shell], its employees, and agents harmless 
from and against all claims, demands and causes of 
action of every kind and character arising in favor 
of . . . [Brinkerhoff's] employees, . . . [Shell's] 
employees or third parties on account of bodily 
injuries, death or damage to property arising out of 
or in connection with the performance of this agree-
ment, except where such injury, death or damage has 
resulted from the sole negligence of . . . [Shell], 
without negligence or willful act on the part of . . . 
[Brinkerhoff], its agents, servants, employees, or 
subcontractors. . . . [Brinkerhoff] shall defend all 
suits brought upon such claims and pay all costs and 
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expenses incidental thereto, but . . . [Shell] shall 
have the right, at its option, to participate in the 
defense of any such suit without relieving . . . 
[Brinkerhoff] of any obligation hereunder. 
Id. at 1189 n.l. 
In Shell Oil, this Court held that this indemnification 
agreement clearly and unequivocally expressed Brinkerhoff's 
intention to indemnify Shell from losses attributable to 
Shell's own negligence. 
The three Utah cases Young relies on are not applicable to 
the fact situation that existed between Young and Marveon at 
the time of the Purchase Agreement. 
In Howe Rents Corp. v. Worthen, 18 Utah 2d 263, 420 P.2d 
848 (1966), Howe, who was in the business of renting equipment 
to the public, attached a cement mixer to Worthen's truck. 
Worthen played no part in attaching the cement mixer to the 
truck. The mixer came loose from the truck, overturned, and 
was damaged. Howe sued Worthen for the damages to the mixer 
pursuant to the terms of the rental agreement. The Court held 
that language to the effect that bailee "shall be liable for 
all damage to or loss of equipment regardless of cause" does 
not constitute a clear and unequivocal expression creating an 
obligation for bailee to indemnify the bailor for the bailor's 
own negligence. 
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However, in that case, unlike this case, the indemnitee had 
every opportunity, power, and ability to make sure the cement 
mixer was properly attached. In this case, from and after the 
Purchase Agreement, Young had total control of the sign and 
Marveon had none. 
In Union Pacific Railroad Co. v. El Paso Natural Gas Co., 
17 Utah 2d 255, 408 P.2d 910 (Utah 1965), an El Paso employee 
was struck by the railroad's train at a crossing. The employee 
sued the railroad. The railroad settled the case, then sought 
indemnification from El Paso pursuant to the terms of an ease-
ment agreement. The court held that language to the effect 
that El Paso would indemnify Union Pacific from and against 
"any and all liability . . . of whatsoever nature . . . howso-
ever caused ..." did not create an agreement to indemnify the 
railroad from its own negligence. However, in that case, un-
like this case, El Paso had an easement across the railroad, an 
El Paso employee was hit by a train at the crossing and could 
not sue El Paso because of workmen's compensation exclusive 
remedy, and El Paso had to agree to the indemnification 
provision to get the easement in the first place. 
In Freund v. Utah Power & Light, 625 F. Supp. 272 (D. Utah 
1985), Judge Winder held that the indemnity provision at issue 
did not clearly and unequivocally express the intention to 
indemnify Utah Power & Light from losses attributable to its 
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own negligence. However, Freund, unlike this case, dealt with 
the factual situation where after the execution of the 
underlying agreement the indemnitor and the indemnitee were 
both going to continue to do business side by side, on the same 
poles. In this case, Young specifically promised to obtain 
insurance, up to one million dollars, to "fully protect" 
Marveon. In this case, Marveon did not need protection for 
Young's negligent acts prior to the Purchase Aqreement—Young 
had nothing to do with the sign prior to the Purchase 
Agreement. Marveon did not need insurance for Young's acts 
after the Purchase Agreement. Marveon did not need insurance 
for Marveon's acts after the Purchase Agreement—Marveon was 
going totally out of business and selling all its assets to 
Young. The only thing Marveon needed insurance for to "fully 
protect" itself was for Marveon's acts prior to the Purchase 
Agreement, and this is exactly what Young promised to do, i.e., 
purchase insurance to "fully protect" Marveon. 
In this case, Young agreed to provide insurance coverage 
adequate to fully protect Marveon. Marveon was going out of 
business and Marveon was selling its assets to Young. This was 
an arms length transaction where both parties knew Marveon 
would never again have any control over the signs. Paragraph 
2.a. could not apply to anyone other than Marveon, and could 
not apply to any negligence other than Marveon's negligence. 
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Marveon needed no provision to protect Marveon against Young's 
negligence. Marveon could not be sued for Young's negligence. 
Marveon was going out of business, Marveon wanted to be pro-
tected from future lawsuits, and thus the provision of para-
graph 2.a. whereby Young agreed to provide, at its expense, 
insurance coverage adequate to fully protect Marveon. 
This case is different from all other Utah indemnification 
cases. Here there is no employer about to lose the exclusive 
remedy of workmen's compensation. Here there is no party with 
little or no bargaining power forced to enter into an adhesion 
contract including an indemnification agreement to get the use 
of the product, or to be employed as a subcontractor, etc. In 
this case, there was an arms length transaction wherein it made 
sound business sense for Young, who was forever after to con-
trol and maintain the sign, to protect Marveon, with insurance, 
against future lawsuits. 
Both the trial judge and the Court of Appeals, after full 
briefing and full argument, simply enforced the terms of the 
contract. The decision is not in conflict with prior decisions 
of this Court, nor is it a "departure from the accepted and 
usual course of judicial proceedings [that] requires this Court 
to exercise its power of supervision." Young lost, but Young 
has had its full day in court. There is nothing special about 
this case justifying a second, full blown appellate review. 
The Petition should be denied. 
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CONCLUSION 
Young's Petition for Certiorari is untimely, and attempts 
to raise issues for the first time that were not raised below 
or preserved on appeal. There is no special or important rea-
son why this case should be entitled to two levels of appellate 
review. Young's Petition should, therefore, be denied. 
Respectfully submitted this day of June, 1989. 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
By /</. l/e^du**^ 
Robert H. Henderson 
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CORPORATION, et aJL. , 
Defendants. 
DEFENDANT MARVEON'S MOTION 
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AGAINST 
DEFENDANT YOUNG ELECTRIC 
Civil No. C85-4307 
Judge Scott Daniels 
Pursuant to Rule 56 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, 
defendant Marveon Sign Company moves the Court for Summary 
Judgment in its favor, and against defendant Young Electric 
Sign Company, that in the event any judgment is returned in 
favor of plaintiffs and against Marveon, Marveon is entitled to 
be indemnified by Young Electric for the full amount of any 
such judgment up to $1,000,000, and that Marveon be awarded its 
costs and attorney's fees incurred herein. 
oa03£4 
This Motion is based on the pleadings and depositions on 
file herein, and is supported by a Memorandum which more fully 
sets forth the basis of this Motion* 
DATED t h i s 21 day of £Q/D6F{t 1986. 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
robert H. Henderson 





AFFIDAVIT OF SERVICE 
STATE OF UTAH 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) ss, 
DQNNA L. CAMPBELL , being sworn, says 
that she is employed in the law offices of Snow, Christensen 
& Martineau, attorneys for Marveon Sign, Inc. 
herein, that she served the attached Motion for Summary Judgment 
Against Defendant Young Electric and Memorandum in Support 
of Marveon's Motion for Summary Judgment Against Young Electric 
in Civil Number C85-4307 , Third Judicial District 
Court upon the following parties by placing a true and correct 
copy thereof in an envelope addressed to: 
Mark 0. Van Wagoner 
VAN WAGONER & STEVENS 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
185 South State St., Ste. 550 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Roger H. Bullock 
STRONG & HANNI 
6th Floor, Boston Bldg. 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorneys for Smiths 
Paul H. Matthews 
HANSON & DUNN 
Attorneys for Image 
175 South West Temple 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
and causing the same to be mailed, first class, postage prepaid, 
on the 3rd day of October , 1985. 
Gary D. Stott 
RICHARDS, BRANDT, MILLER 
& NELSON 
50 South Main, 7th Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84144 
Attorneys for Young Electric 
Paul S. Felt 
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER 
P.O. Box 3850 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110 
Attorneys for Dee's, Inc. 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this 3rd day of 
October , 1985. 
My Commission Expires: 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
Residing in the State of Utah 
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E X H I B I T " B " 
FILED IN CLERK'S OFFICE 
5ALf LAKE COUNTY. UTAH 
OCT 6 4 17 PH '86 
ROBERT H. HENDERSON 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
Attorneys for Marveon Sign 
10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor 
Post Office Box 45000 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145 
Telephone: (801) 521-9000 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
TOSHIKO PICKHOVER, et a_l. , 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF 
Plaintiffs, MARVEON'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT AGAINST YOUNG 
vs. ELECTRIC 
SMITH'S MANAGEMENT Civil No. C85-4307 
CORPORATION, et aj.. , 
Judge Scott Daniels 
Defendants. 
INTRODUCTION 
On January 5, 1985, a sign fell off the side of the Smith's 
Food King at 94th South in Sandy, Utah, and struck and killed 
plaintiffs' decedent, John Pickhover. The sign had been 
installed by Marveon Sign Company (Marveon) in 1978. In 
August, 1981, Young Electric Sign Company (YESCO) bought 
Marveon's assets, including Marveon's maintenance contracts, 
including the maintenance contract for the Smith's at 94th 
South in Sandy, Utah. 
l i DUO* NTi! 
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In the August, 1981 Purchase Agreement between YESCO and 
Marveon, YESCO agreed to provide insurance coverage adequate to 
fully protect Marveon against personal injury or death claims 
arising out of the ownership, maintenance, use, service, or 
installation of signs in a minimum amount of $1,000,000. 
Between the August, 1981 Purchase Agreement and the accident of 
January 5, 1985, the maintenance on the sign was performed by 
YESCO and Marveon had nothing to do with the sign. In July, 
1982, the sign came loose from the building and YESCO reat-
tached the sign. YESCO worked on the sign at least three times 
in 1984, the last time just 54 days before the sign fell and 
killed John Pickhover. 
Marveon has moved the Court for summary judgment in its 
favor and against YESCO that, in the event any judgment is 
returned in favor of plaintiffs and against Marveon, Marveon be 
indemnified by YESCO for the full amount of any such judgment 
up to $1,000,000. 
UNDISPUTED MATERIAL FACTS 
1. Marveon installed the sign in August, 1978, six and 
one-half years prior to the accident sued upon. 
2. In August, 1981, Marveon sold its assets, including 




3. The Purchase Agreement between Marveon and YESCO, a 
true and accurate copy which is attached hereto as Exhibit "A," 
provides that YESCO would "provide, at its expense, insurance 
coverage adequate to fully protect [Marveon] against . • . 
personal injury or death claims arising out of the ownership, 
maintenance, use, service, transportation, or installation of 
Displays in a minimum amount of One Million Dollars 
($1,000,000) . M (Purchase Agreement, Section 2.a. at page 3.) 
4. From and after August 28, 1981, YESCO maintained the 
sign at the Smith's Food King at 9400 South, in Sandy, Utah and 
Marveon had nothing to do with the sign. 
5. In July, 1982, Dave Wissler, the Smith's Food King 
Manager at the 94th South store, noticed that the sign in 
question had become partially detached from the building. 
YESCO was notified. Mont Anderson, YESCO Service Manager, 
assigned YESCO service journeymen Michael Thompson and James 
Malm to the job, and Thompson and Malm went to the Smith's Food 
King and resecured the sign. (Depo. of Wissler, pp. 7, 11-12, 
16-17, 23, 35-36, 40; Depo. of Mont Anderson, pp. 9-17, 34, 42; 
Depo. of Michael Thompson, pp. 12-13; Depo. of James S. Malm, 
p. 4; Depo. Ex. 55, 56, 57, 58 and 59, attached hereto.) 
6. Approximately 3-1/2 years later, on January 5, 1985, 
the sign fell off the building and killed John Pickhover. 
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7. Between August, 1981 and January 5, 1985, Marveon hand 
nothing to do with the sign. The sign was maintained by 
YESCO. At least three times in 1984, YESCO did work on the 
sign, the last time just 54 days before the accident. (See 
citations to Wissler Depo. in fact 5 above; Depo. of Mark 
Jacobson, pp. 4-6; Eric Jacobs, pp. 14-15, 11-12, 39-41; Randy 
Lambert, pp. 4-8; Lee Breeze, 4-5; Terry Saxton, pp. 4-6; Depo. 
Ex. 36 & 38 attached hereto.) 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
YESCO AGREED TO FULLY PROTECT MARVEON AGAINST 
PERSONAL INJURY OR DEATH CLAIMS IN A MINIMUM 
AMOUNT OF $1,000,000 AND SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
SHOULD, THEREFORE, BE ENTERED IN FAVOR OF 
MARVEON AND AGAINST YESCO. 
By Section 2.a. of the Purchase Agreement, YESCO unambigu-
ously agreed to provide, at YESCO's expense, insurance coverage 
adequate to fully protect Marveon against personal injury or 
death claims arising out of the ownership, maintenance, use, 
service, or installation of signs up to a minimum amount of 
$1,000,000. 
The stale, old arguments about who agreed to indemnify whom 
for whose negligence are irrelevant to the pending motion for 
summary judgment. The issue is not whether one party agreed to 
indemnify another party for only the first party's negligence, 
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for only the second party negligence, or for both the first 
party and the second party's negligence. On the contrary; 
YESCO specifically agreed to provide insurance coverage ade-
quate to fully protect Marveon against personal injury or death 
claims up to $1,000,000, regardless of whose negligence caused 
the claim. 
Assuming, arguendo, which Marveon vehemently denies, that 
the death arose out of the original installation in 1978, as 
opposed to the installation by YESCO in 1982, YESCO, through 
the Purchase Agreement of 1981, nevertheless agreed to provide 
insurance coverage adequate to fully protect Marveon against 
death claims arising out of the ownership, maintenance, use, 
service, or installation of the sign. 
Viewed in the commercial context of the Purchase Agreement, 
this provision makes eminent good sense. Marveon was going out 
of the sign business. YESCO was taking over Marveon's pre-
established business. Marveon was not interested in litigat-
ing, five to ten years down the line, about whether a claim 
arose out of the sole negligence of YESCO, the sole negligence 
of Marveon, or the combined negligence of YESCO and Marveon. 
Marveon wanted insurance coverage that would fully protect 
Marveon against claims for personal injury or death arising out 
of the signs, regardless of the apportionment of fault. That 
is what Marveon bargained for—that is what YESCO agreed to 
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do. The contract is unambiguous on its face. Marveon's motion 
for summary judgment that, to the extent plaintiffs obtain any 
judgment against Marveon, YESCO be required to indemnify 
Marveon for the full amount of any such judgment up to 
$1,000,000 should, therefore, be granted. 
POINT II 
THE SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHOULD INCLUDE COSTS 
AND ATTORNEY'S FEES. 
Marveon has also moved the court that the summary judgment 
include an award of costs and attorney's fees. Returning again 
to the specific language of the Purchase Agreement, YESCO 
agreed to "fully protect" Marveon against personal injury or 
death "claims." This litigation has been protracted and the 
discovery has been extensive. Approximately 30 depositions 
have been taken. YESCO promptly tendered the defense of this 
suit on August 26, 1985. (See Letter of Robert H. Henderson to 
Gary D. Stott, YESCO's attorney, attached hereto as Exhibit 
"C") YESCO summarily rejected the tender. (See Letter of 
Gary D. Stott attached hereto as Exhibit "D.") Unless 
Marveon*s costs and attorney's fees are paid, YESCO has not 
provided insurance coverage adequate to fully protect Marveon 
against this wrongful death claim. Marveon's summary judgment 
should, therefore, include its costs and attorney's fees. 
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CONCLUSION 
YESCO unequivocally agreed to provide insurance coverage 
adequate to fully protect Marveon against personal injury or 
death claims arising out of the ownership, maintenance, use, 
service, or installation of signs. This case clearly arises 
out of the ownership, maintenance, use, service, or installa-
tion of signs. Marveon*s motion for summary judgment should, 
therefore, be granted that if plaintiffs obtain any judgment 
against Marveon, YESCO be required to indemnify Marveon for the 
full extent of any such judgment up to $1,000,000, and that 
YESCO pay Marveon's costs and attorney's fees incurred herein. 
DATED this 2J day of fiCTC&FfK 1986. 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
Robert'HT" Henderson 




AFFIDAVIT OF SERVICE 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
: ss. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
DONNA L. CAMPBKT.T, , being sworn, says 
that she is employed in the law offices of Snow, Christensen 
& Martineau, attorneys for Marveon Sign, Inc. 
herein, that she served the attached Motion for Summary Judgment 
Against Defendant Young Electric and Memorandum in Support 
of Marveon's Motion for Summary Judgment Acainst YouncT Electric 
in Civil Number C85-4307 , Third Judicial District 
Court upon the following parties by placing a true and correct 
copy thereof in an envelope addressed to: 
Mark 0. Van Wagoner Gary D. Stott 
VAN WAGONER & STEVENS RICHARDS, BRANDT, MILLER 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs & NELSON 
185 South State St., Ste. 550 50 South Main, 7th Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 Salt Lake City, Utah 84144 
Attorneys for Young Electric 
Roger H. Bullock 
STRONG & HANNI Paul S. Felt 
6th Floor, Boston Bldg. RAY, QUINNEY & NE3EKER 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 P.O. Box 3850 
Attorneys for Smiths Salt Lake City, Utah 84110 
Attorneys for Dee's, Inc. 
Paul E. Matthews 
HANSON & DUNN 
Attorneys for Image 
175 South West Temple 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
and causing the same to be mailed, first class, postage prepaid, 
on the 3rd day of October , 1985. 
is 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this 3rd day of 
October , 1985. 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
My Commission Expires: Residing in the State of Utah 
EXHIBIT "A" 
PURCHASE AGREEMENT 
THIS AGREEMENT is entered into this 2^ £ day of #1/(2* , 
1981, by and between Karveon Sign Company, a Utah corporation 
(ffSeller!f) , Young Electric Sign Company, a Utah corporation 
("Buyer'1) , and those persons whose names are set forth on the 
signature page hereof as all stockholders of the Seller, 
("Stockholders"). 
WITNESSETH: 
WHEREAS, Buyer desires to acquire from Seller and Seller 
desires to convey to Buyer certain assets of the Seller as mere 
particularly described and set forth herein; 
NOW, THEREFORE, in consideration of the mutual promises and 
covenants set forth herein and for other good and valuable 
consideration, the sufficiency of which is hereby acknowledged, it 
is agreed as follows: 
Section 1. Assignment of Contract Rights and Displays. 
a. Seller hereby assigns to Buyer all rights of Seller to 
renew all sign lease agreements and sign maintenance agreements set 
forth in Schedule A hereto and all such agreements entered into 
after the date hereof but prior to closing in the normal course of 
business (it being intended that as soon as practical, Schedule A 
shall be updated to include all such additional agreements) and, 
subject to performance by 3uyer of all of its obligations under 
this Agreement, assigns and transfers to Buyer upon the expiration 
of each such sign lease agreement all right, title and interest of 
Seller free and clear of all liens or encumbrances of any kind, in 
the Displays which are subject thereto (the "Displays") except for 
such of the Displays as are subject to transfer to the lessee by 
reason of a purchase option heretofore granted to such lessee. 
Such leases or agreements containing a purchase option to the 
lessee shall be so designated on attached Schedule B. Seller shall 
be entitled to a commission of fifteen percent of all job contracts 
pursuant to which no production has commenced prior to the date of 
closing hereunder but which job contracts have been sold in the 
ordinary course of business prior to the date of closing hereunder. 
All such job contracts are listed in Schedule "N" hereto. Seller 
shall not, directly or indirectly, interfere with or attempt to 
inhibit Buyer in Buyer's efforts to renew or continue business 
relationships with customers upon expiration of applicable 
agreements identified in this paragraph or other paragraphs hereof, 
b. It is further agreed that Seller may be unable to transfer 
title to certain of the leased signs subject to third-party sign 
location leases as more particularly set forth on Schedule C 
attached hereto. 
c. It is further agreed that those certain leases listed in 
attached Schedule D are leases which by agreement do not include 
maintenance or insurance and therefore renewal rights and/or 
residual payment for title transfer at the end thereof remain the 
property of Seller 
d. Seller will take all steps necessary to allow Buyer to 
continue Seller's obligations under the lease and maintenance 
agreements including, where necessary, obtaining the consent of the 
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user of the Display. All leases and other items of property 
excluded from purchase and retained by Seller are listed on 
Schedule D and Schedule E, or in the event not listed on another 
Schedule attached hereto are excluded from the terms hereof. 
Section 2. Assumption of Certain Contractual Obligations. 
a. Buyer agrees to satisfy, perform and discharge when cue 
all obligations of Seller (excluding "sales taxes11 if any, imposed 
in respect to the remaining term of sign lease agreements) 
hereinafter arising under said sign lease agreements and sign 
maintenance agreements until their respective expiration dates, 
including but not limited to service, maintenance and replacer.ent 
of parts, and Buyer further agrees to pay when cue all personal 
property taxes assessed against said Displays in respect of all 
periods ending subsequent to the effective date hereof and to 
'provide, at its expense, insurance coverage adequate to fulljfl 
protect Seller against property damage (including damage to 
Displays and integral parts) or personal injury or death claims 
arising out of the ownership, maintenance, use, service, 
transportations, or installation of Displays' in a minimum amount of 
One Million Dollars ($1,000,000.00). buch insurance shall include 
insurance against damage to said displays 
b. Buyer assumes no liabilities or obligations of Seller 
except as specifically described and set forth herein. 
c. Buyer shall have the right to file and Seller agrees to 
sign reasonable forms of financing statements or security 
agreements to secure Buyer's interests in the underlying signs. 
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Section 3. Inventory. 
a. Seller hereby further agrees to sell and assign to Buyer, 
and Buyer agrees to purchase from Seller, all right, title, and 
interest of Seller in all inventories of materials, parts and 
components not included in work in process, owned by Seller as of 
the date hereof. Said inventories shall be as set forth on 
Schedule F attached hereto and the total purchase price shall be as 
set forth on Schedule F. Terms of the purchase price payment shall 
be as outlined in Section 13 hereof. The original inventory list 
shall be as of July 31, 1981, and shall be updated at closing. 
b. All items listed in the Schedule of inventories of 
materials, parts, and components shall be in new or usable 
condition as of the closing date and must be approved by Buyer at 
closing. 
Section 4. Eouipment. 
a. Seller hereby agrees to sell and Buyer hereby agrees to 
purchase those certain items of property, and equipment, including 
rolling stock as listed on Schedule G, attached hereto. Payment of 
the purchase price shall not include the assumption of any 
liabilities, but shall include those other terms and conditions as 
set forth in Section 13, hereof. The price shall be based on the 
higher of fair market value or book value for each such item. 
b. All such items of property, and equipment, including 
rolling stock shall be in good working condition and in a 
reasonably good state of repair as of the closing date. 
Section 5. Work in Process. 
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a. Seller shall furnish Buyer, prior to closing, a complete 
list of work in process and Buyer shall finish such work in process 
for its own account as soon as practicable after the effective date 
hereof. Buyer shall pay Seller in cash a commission of nine 
percent (9%) of the contract price of the work in process. Buyer 
further agrees to pay Seller in cash for such work in process, the 
cost of direct labor and the cost of material used plus overhead 
equal to 277o of actual material cost and labor. Upon completion of 
such work in process and installation at customer location the sign 
lease agreement and property relating thereto shall be deemed to be 
the sole asset of Buyer. Work in process is listed by contract and 
contract price on the attached Schedule H. 
b. Seller shall be entitled to a commission of fifteen 
percent of ail job contracts pursuant to which no production has 
commenced prior to the date of closing hereunder but which job 
contracts have been sold in the ordinary course of business prior 
to the date of closing hereunder. All such job contracts are 
listed in Schedule lfNlf hereto. 
Section 6. Sign Face Molds. 
Seller shall furnish to Buyer all sign face molds which are 
available and which were used in the production of the Displays 
which are the subject of this Agreement. 
Section 7. Failure of Title. 
In the event that Seller is unable to pass title to Buyer to 
any Display as contemplated by this Agreement at the termination of 
the sign lease agreement applicable thereto, exclusive of Displays 
which are the subject of purchase options (for which provisions is 
made in Section 1 of this Agreement) , then Seller shall reimburse 
Buyer for all maintenance theretofore performed by Buyer with 
respect to such Display based on costs shown on Buyer's monthly 
contract status report, and including personal property taxes and 
sign floater insurance paid, if any, subject, however, to audit by 
Seller. Buyer's costs shall include labor, materials, and 27% 
added thereto as overhead. 
Section 8. Seller's Real Estate Lease. 
a. Buyer hereby agrees to assume, as of the date of closing, 
that certain real estate lease dated Kay 1, 1973, by and between 
Seller and David F. and Bessie B. Sawyer. 3uyer agrees to 
faithfully perform and discharge the terms and conditions of said 
lease. Buyer and Seller shall also enter into a sublease on terms 
and conditions of said Sawyer lease. 
b. Buyer and Seller shall also enter into a lease on terms 
and conditions similar to the terms of the Sawyer lease with regard 
to additional land and improvements at the Marveon shop: The 
rental for which shall be $500 per month. 
c. The Sawyer lease, assignment and consent of Lessors, and 
the other lease are attached hereto as Schedule I, J, and K. The 
consent to assignment by Seller to Buyer shall provide for the 
ability of Buyer to sublease the Sawyer premises to a third party 
without the consent of the Sawyers. 
Section 9. Contract Rewrites. 
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In the event that the lessee under any sign lease agreement 
identified in Schedule A hereof shall desire to rewrite or alter 
such agreement Buyer may negotiate and enter into a new agreement 
with such lessee (to which Seller shall not be a party) if Buyer 
shall pay to Seller the balance owing under the existing sign lease 
agreement upon the same terms and conditions as were available to 
the lessee. In the alternative, Buyer may establish a separate 
agreement with the lessee relating to the changes in the existing 
agreement so long as the original sign lease agreement, as between 
Seller and such lessee, shall continue to be in effect and fully 
performed by such lessee. 
Section 10. Employees. 
a. Buyer shall have the right, but shall be under no 
obligation, to hire such employees as it may desire as were, at the 
date hereof, employed by Seller in connection with Seller's sign 
business. 
b. Buyer agrees to offer employment to Douglas Brown, R.ay 
Draper, and Dennis Remy at not less than their current salaries and 
benefits and to waive any waiting periods for Buyer's employment 
benefits, to the extent legally possible to allow ten years 
seniority in relation to said benefits. 
c. Buyer agrees to retain Seller as a consultant with regard 
to business assumed hereunder and to pay Seller an annual 
consulting fee of $50,000, on an equal monthly basis, for the first 
two 12-month periods after closing and $25,000 annually during each 
of the subseauent two 12-month Deriocs. Seller may also continue 
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to represent Buyer in sales promotion activities, and shall be 
entitled to standard commissions and approved expenses for any and 
all contracts negotiated by Seller on behalf of Buyer which such 
contracts are acceptable to Buyer. 
d. Buyer agrees to provide Seller with a copy of its annual 
audited financial statements until all terms hereof have been 
performed. 
Section 11. Eminent Domain. 
In the event that Buyer is required to remove or alter any of 
the Displays by reason of eminent domain or condemnation 
proceedings under circumstances whereunder the effect of such 
removal or alteration would render the effected Display unavailable 
for transfer to Buyer at the expiration of the applicable sign 
lease agreement in substantially the condition or location now7 
existing, then, in such event, Seller shall be responsible for the 
cost of removal or alteration of such Display and shall be entitled 
to receive any condemnation award in connection with the required 
removal or alteration. Section 9 hereof shall then apply to 
reimbursement of Buyer's costs to date of such removal. 
Section 12. Billing of Seller's Customers. 
Seller shall establish a system and. be responsible for billing 
on all accounts for the benefit of Seller with respect to those 
accounts wherein Buyer has assumed maintenance responsibilities 
under Section One hereof. Buyer shall have the right to examine 
the billing records at any reasonable time. 
Section 13. Pavment of Purchase Price. 
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a. The final purchase price shall be allocated in the 
following categories as per a schedule approved by both parties 
hereto. 
(1) Inventory 
(2) Office Equipment 
(3) Plant Equipment 
(4) Rolling Stock 
(5) Work in Process - Under Production 
(6) Contracts Sold - No Production Started 
(7) Other Property 
Total $ 
b. The final purchase price shall be paid with a 30% cash 
down payment on September 2, 1981, and the balance evidenced by a 
promissory note in the form attached hereto as Schedule M. The 
terms of the note will be basically as follows: 
Twenty-four equal monthly installments with annual interest 
calculated at the First Interstate prime rate on the day of 
closing, adjusted quarterly thereafter beginning, January 1, 
1982, but not less than 15% per annum. 
Section 14. Conveyances. 
The Seller hereby agrees that at the Closing hereunder, it 
will deliver to Buyer such bills of sale with covenants of general 
warranty, endorsements, assignments, and other good and sufficient 
instruments of transfer, assignment, and conveyance, in form 
satisfactory to Buyer and its counsel, as shall be effective to 
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vest in Buyer good and marketable title to all of the properties 
and assets of the Seller being purchased hereunder, except as to 
those liens and encumbrances as listed on Schedule L hereto. 
Section 15. Delinquent Accounts. 
Seller shall notify Buyer of any sign lease agreement or sign 
maintenance agreement that becomes more than 60 days delinquent in 
payment, and, Buyer's obligation to any sign lease agreement more 
than 60 days delinquent shall be suspended upon notice from Seller 
until the account has been paid current or arrangements 
satisfactory to Seller have been made for payment of the account. 
In the event any of the Displays are repossessed by Seller due to 
the lessee's default, title thereto shall be transferred to Buyer 
only when (i) Buyer has paid all costs of repossession, in which 
event Buyer shall be responsible for all further expenses in 
connection with said Display, or (ii) at the conclusion of probable 
or existing litigation involving said Display in which event Buyer 
shall hold and protect said Display in storage for Seller until any 
such litigation has been concluded, not to exceed 1 year after the 
expiration of the Underlying Customer Agreement. Seller shall 
reimburse Buyer for any required reinstallation expense. 
Section 16. Free Access to Plants, Properties, and Records. 
The Seller shall give to Buyer and to its counsel, accountants 
and other representatives, and to independent auditors selected by 
it, free and full access, during normal business hours, throughout 
the period from the date hereof to the Closing, to all of the 
Seller's properties, books, contracts, leases, commitments, and 
-10- 000^4 
records, and the Seller shall furnish Buyer during this period with 
all financial and operating data and other information as to the 
business, properties, and assets of the Seller as Buyer from tine 
to time may reasonably request of the Seller. 
Section 17. Conduct of the SellerTs Business prior to Closing. 
Unless Buyer's prior written consent to a departure from any 
of the following shall have been obtained, prior to the Closing: 
a. The Seller's business shall be conducted in a good and 
prudent manner and only in the ordinary course of business; 
b. No contract, contract amendment, lease, agreement, plan, 
or commitment shall be entered into by or on behalf of the Seller 
with respect to the properties and assets to be acquired by Buyer 
hereunder, unless it was entered into in the ordinary course of the 
Seller's business and does not constitute a breach of any of the 
representations and warranties set forth in any Section hereof. 
c. The Seller and the Stockholders will use their best 
efforts to preserve for Buyer the good will of all the firms and 
persons having business relations with Seller; and 
d. The Seller will duly comply with all laws applicable to it 
and to the conduct of its business. 
Section 18. Actions by the Seller and the Stockholders on and 
• • • 
after the Closing. 
a. The Seller and the Stockholders will cooperate, and will 
use all reasonable efforts to have the officers, directors, and 
other employees of the Company cooperate, with Buyer at its 
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request, on and after the Closing Date, in endeavoring to conduct 
its business. 
b. The Seller and the Stockholders agree to use all 
reasonable efforts to persuade those employees of the Seller that 
Buyer may designate to become employees of Buyer after the Closing 
Date. 
c. Except as provided in Section 10.c. above, Seller agrees 
to refer all calls received by Seller for new work including sales 
leads, maintenance, installation, etc. to Buyer. Seller shall 
coordinate all such sales activities under Section 10.c. with the 
appropriate representative of Buyer. 
Section 19. The Closing. 
The purchase of assets described in this Agreement shall be 
consummated at Closing to be held at the offices of counsel for 
Buyer in Salt Lake City, Utah, at 4:00 P.M., local time, on the 2nd 
day of September, 1981, or at such other place, time, and date as 
the parties hereto shall mutually agree upon. The date and event 
of such purchase of assets are, respectively, herein referred to as 
the "Closing DateM and the "Closing." 
Section 19. Representations, Warranties, and Covenants of the 
Seller. 
The Seller and the Stockholders, severally, hereby represent, 
warrant, and covenant to Buyer as follows: 
a. The Seller is a corporation duly organized and in good 
standing under the laws of the State of Utah. The Seller has the 
power to own its properties and assets and to carry on its business 
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as it is now being conducted, and is duly qualified to do business 
and is in good standing in every jurisdiction in which the nature 
of its business makes qualification necessary. 
b. The Seller has, and on the Closing Date will have, good 
and marketable title to all assets described in Schedules hereof as 
being owned by it. All such assets are subject to no liens, 
mortgages, pledges, encumbrances, or charges of any kind except 
those described in Schedule L. 
c. Except as provided in Schedule L, the Seller is not a 
party to any contract adversely affecting assets being purchased or 
contracts being assumed. 
From the date hereof to and including the Closing Date, the 
Seller will not enter into any such contract or contracts without 
the prior written consent of Buyer. The Seller has performed in 
all material respects all obligations required to be performed by 
it to the date hereof and is -not in default in any material respect 
under any agreements, leases, or other documents to which it is a 
party and to which Buyer is succeeding or assuming obligations 
hereunder. 
d. There are no actions, suits, or proceedings pending or 
threatened against or affecting the Seller at law, in equity or 
admiralty, or before or by any federal, state, municipal, or other 
governmental department, commission, board, bureau, agency, or 
instrumentality, domestic or foreign, that involve any claim 
against the assets being purchased or contracts being assumed, 
unless disclosed herein. 
-n- GUO** 
e. In all material respects, the Seller has performed and 
abided by all the obligations required to be performed by it to the 
date hereof with respect to contracts assumed by Buyer, and will 
continue to abide by and perform them up to and including the 
Closing Date, and the Seller is not in default and to the extent 
that it will be materially affected adversely under a license, 
permit, order, authorization, grant, agreement, lease, or other 
document, order, or regulation to which it is a party or by.which 
it is bound, affecting such contracts. 
f. The Seller has complied in all material respects with all 
applicable statutes and regulations of any governmental authority 
having jurisdiction over it or applicable to its business. 
g. In the conduct of its business during the preceding three 
years and as now operated, the Seller has not infringed any United 
States or foreign patents of others. The Seller owns or possesses 
adequate license or other rights to use all trademarks, trace 
names, and copyrights that are employed in the conduct of its 
business and has not received any notice of conflict with any 
asserted rights of others that remain in effect. 
h. By appropriate vote of its Board of Directors and by 
either the unanimous written consent of its stockholders or their 
unanimous vote at a meeting duly called, convened, and held, all in 
accordance with law and its Articles of Incorporation and Bylaws, 
the Seller has full power to execute and perform this Agreement and 
to transfer its properties and assets as herein provided, and such 
execution and performance does not conflict with any provisions of 
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its Articles of Incorporation or Bylaws or with any contract to 
which it is a party or to which it is subject.-
i. None of the Seller's properties and assets to be 
transferred to Buyer pursuant to this Agreement is subject to any 
restriction or limitation prohibiting, restricting, or requiring 
any consent to such transfer unless specifically denoted herein. 
j. Attached hereto as Schedule N and hereby made a part 
hereof is a detailed schedule of all of the Seller's jobs that, as 
of the date hereof, had been sold in the ordinary course of 
business of the Seller and upon which production had not commenced 
showing, with respect to each such job, the job number, the name of 
the purchaser, (lessee), and the total contract price. 
k. Each of the representations and warranties set forth in 
this Section shall be true at and as of the time of Closing with 
the same force and effect as though made at and as of the time of 
Closing. 
Section 21. Representations, Warranties and Covenants of Buyer. 
Buyer hereby represents, warrants, and covenants to the Seller 
and the Stockholders as follows: 
a. Buyer is a corporation duly organized, validly existing, 
and in good standing under the laws of the State of Utah, and is 
duly qualified to do business as a foreign corporation in all 
jurisdictions where it does business. 
b. Purchaser has full power, in accordance with law, to 
execute and perform this Agreement, and such execution and 
performance does not conflict, with any provisions of its Articles 
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of Incorporation or bylaws, as amended to the date hereof, or with 
any contract to which it is a party or to which it is subject. The 
Board of Directors of Buyer has authorized, or before the Closing 
will have authorized, this Agreement, the transactions contemplated 
herein, and the execution and delivery hereof. 
c. Each of the representations and warranties set forth in 
this Section shall be true at and as of the time of Closing with 
the same force and effect as though made at and as of the time of 
Closing, and shall survive the Closing. 
Section 22. Conditions Precedent to the Buyer's Obligations. 
All obligations of Buyer to be discharged under this Agreement 
at the Closing are subject to fulfillment prior to or at the 
Closing of each of the following conditions, unless expressly 
waived in writing by Buyer at any time prior to the Closing: 
a. Buyer shall not have discovered any material error, 
misstatement, or omission in their representations, warranties, and 
covenants made by the Seller and the Stockholders herein. 
b. The representations, warranties and covenants of the 
Seller and the Stockholders set forth herein shall be decerned to 
have been made again at and as of the time of Closing and then 
shall be true in all material respects, except as modified as of 
the time of Closing to the extent necessary to reflect intervening 
transactions expressly permitted hereunder; the Seller and the 
Stockholder shall have performed and complied with all the terms, 
covenants, and conditions required by this Agreement to be 
performed by them prior to or at the Closing. 
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c. The Bulk Sales Law of the State of Utah has been cor.plied 
with or is inapplicable to this transaction and Seller hereby 
indemnifies Buyer with regard to any claims thereunder. 
d. The schedules attached hereto shall indicate all leases, 
signs, equipment, inventory, and other assets pledged to secure any 
debt of Seller. Buyer shall have the right to review all loan 
documents and pledge agreements relating to such assets and debt 
and shall be entitled to satisfy itself, prior to closing, as to 
the ability of Seller to pay off such debt so as to enable Seller 
to pass title to such assets to Buyer. 
Section 23. Conditions Precedent to the Obligations of the Seller 
and the Stockholders, 
All obligations of the Seller and the Stockholders to be 
discharged under this Agreement are subject to the fulfillment, 
prior to or at the time of Closing, of each of the following 
conditions, unless waived in writing by the Seller and the 
Stockholders at any time prior to the Closing: 
a. Buyer's representations and warranties set forth herein 
shall be deemed to have been made again at and as of the time cf 
the Closing and then shall be true in all material respects. Buyer 
shall have performed and complied with all covenants, agreements, 
and conditions required by this Agreement to be performed by it 
prior to or at the time of Closing. 
Section 24. Nature and Survival of Representations, Warranties, 
Covenants, and Agreements. 
Buyer, the Seller, and the Stockholders agree that: 
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1. Their respective representations and warranties set forth 
in this Agreement shall survive the Closing and thereafter shall be 
fully effective and enforceable, and shall not be affected by any 
investigation, verification, or approval by any party hereto or by 
anyone on behalf of any such party; 
2. Their respective covenants and agreements set forth in 
this Agreement, except those covenants and agreements that are 
required, expressly by this Agreement to be fully kept, performed, 
and discharged on or before the Closing, shall survive the Closing 
and thereafter shall be fully effective and enforceable; 
3. After the Closing and prior to any dissolution of the 
Seller, the representations and warranties and the surviving 
covenants and agreements herein made by the Seller shall be binding 
upon, performed by, and enforceable against the Seller, except that 
all the costs of such performance shall be borne and paid by the 
Stockholders; 
4. In the event of dissolution of the Seller, all 
representations and warranties herein made by either the Seller, 
the Stockholders, or both and the surviving covenants and 
agreements herein made by either the Seller, the Stockholders, or 
both, shall be deemed to be assumed by the Stockholders; 
5. No liability of the Seller for or by reason of breach of 
any of its said representations, warranties, covenants, and 
agreements shall be deemed to be a liability of the Seller assumed 
by Buyer hereunder, but, on the contrary, shall remain the 
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liability of the Seller, the Stockholders, or both, as provided 
herein. 
Section 25. EnrDlovment and Noncompetition. 
- • - * • . - - * • 
a. Buyer shall not have any obligations with respect to 
hiring or any other matters as to present or past employees of the 
Seller. 
b. The Seller and all Stockholders of the Seller shall enter 
into a noncompetition agreement in the form attached hereto as 
Schedule 0. 
Section 26. Miscellaneous. 
a. The Seller, or, after its dissolution, its surviving 
directors, trustees, or receiver, and the Stockholders, at any tine 
and from time to time after the Closing Date, upon the request of 
Buyer and without further consideration, will do, execute, 
acknowledge, and deliver all such further actions, deeds, bills of 
sale, assignments, transfers, conveyances, powers of attorney, and 
assurances, and will take such other action, as reasonably may be 
required by Buyer, to assign, convey, transfer, and deliver to, and 
vest in, Buyer and put it in possession of, and protect its right 
and title to, interest in, and enjoyment of, the properties and 
assets of the Seller intended to be assigned, conveyed, 
transferred, and delivered pursuant to this Agreement. 
b. Subject to the terms, provisions, and conditions hereof, 
this Agreement shall be binding upon and shall inure to the benefit 
of the parties hereto and their respective heirs, executors, 
administrators, successors, and assigns. 
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c. Any notice, request, instruction, or other document to be 
given hereunder to any party shall be in writing, delivered 
personally or sent by registered mail or certified United States 
Air Mail, postage prepaid, or telegram as follows: 
Addresses of the Parties: 
Young Electric Sign Company 
c/o Thomas Young, Jr. President 
P.O. Box 25728 
Salt Lake City, UT 84125 
Marveon Sign Company 
c/o Glen Jerry Brown 
4875 Knollwood Drive 
Ogden, Utah 84403 
Any party may change his or its address for purposes of this 
paragraph by giving notice of change of address to the other 
parties in the manner herein provided for giving notice. 
d. This instrument contains the entire agreement between the 
parties hereto with respect to the transactions contemplated hereby 
and shall not be changed or terminated except by a written 
instrument signed by the parties hereto. 
e. All exhibits and Schedules attached hereto are 
incorporated herein. 
f. This Agreement is declared to have been made under the 
laws of the State of Utah. 
g. The section and other headings contained in this Agreement 
are for reference purposes only and shall not in any way affect the 
meaning or interpretation of this Agreement. 
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h. This Agreement may be executed in any number of 
counterparts, and all of these counterparts together shall 
constitute one and the same Agreement. 
i. The invalidity or unenforceability of any provision hereof 
shall not affect nor impair any other provision hereof. 
j. The failure of any party to enforce the provisions of this 
Agreement shall not constitute a waiver unless specifically stated 
in writing, signed-by the party whose rights are deemed waived, 
regardless of a party's knowledge of a breach hereunder. 
k. In the event of default, the defaulting party shall be 
liable for all reasonable costs of enforcement including attorney's 
fees. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties hereto have caused this 
Agreement to be duly executed as of the day and year first above 
written. 
MARVEON SiGj/iCOKPANY ^—~^> YOUNG ELECTRIC SIGN COMPANY 
EON STOCKHOLDERS 
By: / ^ / ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ l ' ^ ^ 
Marva/S. Brown, StocK.no3.aer 









































SO SOME OF THE SIGN WAS STILL FLUSH AGAINST THE 
THE TOP PART OF THE SIGN WAS -- WELL -- WELL, I 
IF IT WOULD BE FLUSH. IT WOULD BE MAYBE AN INCH 
BUT --
BUT MUCH CLOSER THAN THE BOTTOM RIGHT? 
MUCH CLOSER. 
SO THE BOTTOM PART IS THE PART THAT CAME 6 OR 7 
FROM THE BUILDING? 
YES. 
NOW, YOU SAID A CUSTOMER PARKED IN THE FIRE LANE? 
A CUSTOMER HAD PARKED IN THE FIRE LANE. IT'S 
SO -- THE LAW STATES YOU CANNOT PARK THERE IN 





UP AND PARKED THERE. AND AS THEY GOT OUT OF 
THEY NOTICED THE SIGN AND CALLED MY ATTENTION TO 
THAT FIRE LANE WHERE THE CUSTOMER HAD PARKED HIS 




WOULD WALK IN NOW. 
BECAUSE THAT'S WHERE THE ENTRANCE IS NOW? 
UM-HM. BUT BACK THEN IT WAS JUST A FIRE LANE 
RIGHT IN FRONT OF THE STORE, AND IT WAS ALL PAINTED RED, LIKE 







OKAY. LOOK, ALL WE'RE TRYING TO GET IS WHAT YOU 
YES. 
YOU DON'T REMEMBER DOING THAT? 














I DON'T REMEMBER CALLING THE SIGN COMPANY. 
YOU THINK THAT EITHER YOU DID OR CAROLYN DID? 
CORRECT. 
BUT YOU'RE NOT ABLE TO TELL ME NOW HOW THAT 
? 
CORRECT. 
ALL RIGHT. DO YOU HAVE A MEMORY OF SOME SIGN 
:OMING OUT TO THE BUILDING AND FIXING WHAT THE 
CALLED YOUR ATTENTION TO? 
YES, I DO BECAUSE SOME SIGN COMPANY CAME OUT AND 







DO YOU REMEMBER WHO IT WAS THAT CAME? 
I DON'T. 
CAN YOU REMEMBER THEM BY NAME? 
THE ONLY THING THAT I'M GOING OFF OF IS MY 
EXPERIENCE WITH IT AT THAT TIME. AT THAT TIME I 
WAS YOUNG SIGN COMPANY THAT HAD THE CONTRACT, AND 








I CAN'T REMEMBER EXACTLY. 
WHAT MAKES YOU THINK IT WAS YOUNG? 
BECAUSE I JUST -- I'M GOING ON MY PREVIOUS 
AND 1 THINK IT WAS YOUNG SIGN COMPANY THAT HAD THE 
AT THE TIME. 
DID YOU KNOW ANY OF THE INDIVIDUALS FROM YOUNG 






NO, I DIDN'T KNOW ANY INDIVIDUALS PERSONALLY OR 
OF THEM. 






OUT ON A 
NO, NO. IT WAS SOMETHING THAT -- FOR EXAMPLE, 
THE CONTRACT CHANGED COMPANIES, AND THAT'S WHY I SAY 
REMEMBER EXACTLY WHETHER IT'S YOUNG SIGN COMPANY 
IT CHANGED COMPANIES. THE OTHER SIGN COMPANY CAME 
REGULAR BASIS TO CHECK THE LIGHTS AND EVERYTHING, SO 
I CAN REMEMBER THAT GENTLEMAN BECAUSE HE CAME OUT ON A 
REGULAR 
REPAIRS 
BASIS AT THIS TIME. IF THERE WASN'T ANY NECESSARY 
ON IT, NO ONE CAME OUT. AND THE CONTRACT -- AND I 
DON'T KNOW HOW THE CONTRACT READ, IF THEY WERE SUPPOSED TO 
COME OUT 
Q 
AND CHECK EVERYTHING OR NOT. 
SO THE PEOPLE THAT CAME OUT AND CHANGED THE 
LIGHTS WERE IMAGE? 



























Q HOW ABOUT JERRY BROWN? 
A NO. 
Q ALL RIGHT. YOU'VE TOLD US THAT YOU THINK THAT 
YOUNG SIGN COMPANY HAD THE MAINTENANCE CONTRACT. YOU'VE 
TOLD US THAT IMAGE DID THE LIGHTS. CAN YOU TELL US ABOUT ANY 
OTHER SIGN COMPANY THAT, DURING YOUR THREE YEARS THERE, HAD 
ANYTHING TO DO WITH THE SIGNS ON THE SMITH'S FOOD KING AT 
94TH SOUTH? 
A NOT TO MY KNOWLEDGE THAT ANYONE ELSE WAS INVOLVED 
WITH. IN FACT, AT THE TIME I DON'T THINK IMAGE WAS INVOLVED, 
NOT TO MY KNOWLEDGE. I'M SAYING THAT WAS LATER. 
Q WHEN THEY CHANGED THE LIGHTS? 
A WHEN THEY CHANGED THE LIGHTS WAS WHEN I WAS AT 
ANOTHER STORE. 
Q OH, REALLY. SO DURING THE TIME THAT YOU WERE THE 
MANAGER AT THE 9<+TH SOUTH STORE IN NOVEMBER OF '79 UNTIL YOU 
LEFT THAT STORE IN AUGUST, SEPTEMBER 1982, YOU'RE NOT AWARE 
OF IMAGE HAVING ANYTHING TO DO WITH THE SIGNS AT 9<+TH SOUTH? 
A NO, NO. LIKE I SAY, THE ONLY TIME I WAS AWARE 
OF THE IMAGE SIGN COMPANY WAS AT THE OTHER STORE. 
Q SO I UNDERSTAND YOUR ANSWER --
A I'M SORRY. 
Q NO, THAT'S FINE. 
SO THE ONLY SIGN COMPANY YOU HAVE A RECOLLECTION 
OF DEALING WITH DURING THE TIME YOU WERE THE MANAGER OF THE 






















OF 1982, WAS YOUNG ELECTRIC SIGN COMPANY? 
YES. 
WHAT'S YOUR EDUCATIONAL LEVEL, SIR? 
I GRADUATED FROM HIGH SCHOOL. 
WHAT YEAR? 
IN 1963, HIGHLAND HIGH SCHOOL. 
WHAT'S YOUR AGE? 
FORTY-ONE. 
WOULD YOU MIND GIVING US YOUR HOME PHONE NUMBER 
GET YOU IF WE NEED YOU FOR TRIAL? 
255-0259. 
AND YOU DON'T HAVE ANY PLANS OF MOVING OUT OF THE 
VALLEY, DO YOU? 
NO. 
NOW, WHEN DID YOU FIRST BECAME AWARE THAT THE 
IN FACT, FALL OFF THE 9^TH SOUTH SMITH'S FOOD KING 
5, 1985? 
FROM THE NEWS MEDIA. IT WAS ON THE TELEVISION. 
SO RIGHT AWAY? 
YES. 
AND DID YOU EVER HAVE ANY DISCUSSION WITH ANY 
PERSON EMPLOYED BY SMITH'S ABOUT THAT SIGN HAVING FALLEN OFF? 
A I HAD JUST STATED TO ONE OF THE SUPERVISORS THAT 
I HAD REMEMBERED THE SIGN HAD COME LOOSE AND I HAD HAD 
000360 
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OUTSIDE. 1 DIDN'T CHECK THE INSIDE. 
Q TELL ME WHAT YOU DID TO CHECK THE SIGN OUTSIDE. 
A AFTER HE HAD STATED THAT HE HAD FIXED THE SIGN 
AND EVERYTHING WAS DONE, I WENT OUTSIDE AND CHECKED THE SIGN. 
AND IT WAS AGAIN BACK AGAINST THE WALL, THE PART OF THE OUT-
SIDE OF THE BUILDING. 
Q YOU DIDN'T ASK THE PEOPLE WHO WERE THERE THAT 
WERE REPAIRING IT EITHER WHY IT HAD COME LOOSE OR WHAT THEY 
HAD DONE TO SECURE IT TO MAKE SURE IT DIDN'T COME LOOSE 
AGAIN? 
A NO, 1 DIDN'T. I TOTALLY RELIED ON THEIR ABILITY 
TO REPAIR. 
MR. BULLOCK: THEIR EXPERTISE? 
THE WITNESS: YES. 
Q (BY MR. VAN WAGONER) IS MR. BULLOCK YOUR LAWYER 
FOR THIS LAWSUIT? DO YOU HAVE A LAWYER? 
A NO. 
Q WAS THERE ACCESS IN THE BUILDING FOR YOU TO BE 
ABLE TO GO UP AND SEE HOW THE SIGN WAS FASTENED? 
A THERE'S A CATWALK THAT WAS UP ON THAT PART OF THE 
BUILDING FOR SHOPLIFTING, AND YOU COULD WALK UP AND SEE. 
APPROXIMATELY IT WOULD BE 5 TO 6 FEET FROM THE CATWALK TO THE 
FRONT PART OF THE BUILDING, WHICH YOU COULD SEE. YOU KNOW, 
YOU COULD SEE WHERE IT WOULD BE FASTENED. BUT THE --




BY MR. MATTHEWS: 
Q DO I UNDERSTAND CORRECTLY THAT THE ONLY SIGN 
COMPANY YOU CAN RECALL DEALING WITH AT THE TIME YOU WERE 
MANAGER OF THE SANDY STORE WAS YESCO, YOUNG ELECTRIC SIGN 
COMPANY? 
A YES. 
Q AND WITH REGARD TO IMAGE --
(A DISCUSSION WAS HAD OFF THE 
RECORD.) 
Q (BY MR. MATTHEWS) I JUST HAVE ONE MORE QUESTION, 
JUST SO I'M CLEAR ON THE MATTER, AND THAT IS THAT ALTHOUGH 
IMAGE NATIONAL MAY OR MAY NOT HAVE HAD SOME KIND OF CONTRACT 
WITH SMITH'S DURING THE TIME YOU WERE MANAGER AT THE SANDY 
STORE, IS IT TRUE THAT YOU DON'T REMEMBER HAVING ANY CONTACT 
WHATSOEVER WITH IMAGE DURING THAT TIME? 
A THAT'S -- THAT'S CORRECT. 
MR. MATTHEWS: OKAY. THANK YOU. I DON'T HAVE 
ANY MORE QUESTIONS. 
EXAMINATION 
BY MR. FELT: 
Q MR. WISSLER, YOU SAY THAT THE ONLY SIGN COMPANY 
YOU REMEMBER DURING YOUR TENURE AS THE STORE MANAGER AT THE 
9400 SOUTH STORE IS YOUNG ELECTRIC SIGN COMPANY. CAN YOU 
nnnir.? 
TELL ME WHAT YOU REMEMBER ABOUT YOUR DEALINGS WITH THEM? 
A JUST -- I'M JUST GOING ON THE RECOLLECTION THAT 
THAT'S THE COMPANY THAT WAS DEALING WITH SMITH'S AT THE TIME 
THAT I REMEMBER. 
Q SO DO YOU HAVE ANY SPECIFIC MEMORY OF CALLING 
THEM FOR ANY REASON OR SEEING THEM ON THE STORE PREMISES FOR 
ANY REASON? 
A THEY WOULD HAVE BEEN IN THE STORE ON DIFFERENT 
OCCASIONS FOR DIFFERENT THINGS OF CHANGING THE LIGHTS. 
THAT'S WHY 1 SAY I DON'T KNOW IF IMAGE WAS INVOLVED WITH IT 
OR WHO WAS AT THAT TIME. 
WHERE YOU RUN INTO THE PROBLEM IS THE CONTRACT. 
LIKE I STATED TO THESE OTHER GENTLEMEN, WHEN IT'S ON A 
CONTRACT, YOU HAVE A TENDENCY TO THINK THAT SOMEONE'S GOING 
TO COME OUT AND TAKE CARE OF IT, AND INVOICES WEREN'T 
NECESSARY AT THE TIME. AND AS LONG AS YOU COULD PHYSICALLY 
SEE THAT THE PROBLEM WAS CORRECTED, YOU BASICALLY DIDN'T DO 
THAT. 
Q WHAT I'M ASKING YOU IS IF YOU HAVE A PRESENT 
MEMORY OF SEEING ANYONE FROM YESCO, THAT'S YOUNG ELECTRIC 
SIGN COMPANY, ON THE STORE PREMISES DOING ANY WORK. 
A PRESENT TIME? 
Q YES. 
A YES, I DID. 
Q AND WHAT IS YOUR PRESENT MEMORY OF WHAT THEY WERE] 
n n n O C l 
1 MR. BULLOCK: IS THE ANSWER YES? 
2 THE WITNESS: YES. 
3 Q (BY MR. FELT) AND DO YOU REMEMBER ANY TIME 
4 CAROLYN INSTRUCTING YOU TO CALL YOUNG ELECTRIC SIGN COMPANY 
5 TO GET THEM TO THE PREMISES TO DO THE REPAIR? 
6 1 A I CAN'T REMEMBER IF SHE CALLED OR I CALLED. I 
7 JUST CAN'T REMEMBER. 
8 1 Q BUT YOU DO REMEMBER, IN RESPONSE TO SOME OF THOSE 
9 PROBLEMS, SEEING YOUNG ELECTRIC SIGN COMPANY PERSONNEL COME 
10 AND DO rHE REPAIR? 
11 A THAT'S REALLY -- THAT'S WHAT I'M SAYING. I'M 
12 GOING OFF MEMORY AS FAR AS IF I KNOW -- I'M JUST SAYING THAT 
13 TO MY BEST KNOWLEDGE, THAT YOUNG SIGN COMPANY HAD THE CONTRACT 
14 AND I CAN'T SAY YES, ON NOVEMBER 13TH YOUNG SIGN COMPANY 
15 CAME AND --
16 Q I'M NOT ASKING YOU TO DO THAT. I'M JUST ASKING 
17 YOU TO SEARCH YOUR MEMORY ABOUT WHAT YOU REMEMBER ABOUT WHO 
18 RL'SPONDCD TO THESE CALLS TO FIX THE SIGNS, AND I THINK YOU 
19 TOID MT IN YOUR EARLIER TESTIMONY IT WAS THE PCRSONNEL FROM 
20 THL YOUNG LLECTRIC SIGN COMPANY. 
21 A YLb. IHAfb JUST IU 1 Ht BLS1 Of- MY KNOWLEDGL. 
22 Q OKAY. I'M UNCLEAR ON YOUR TESTIMONY ABOUT WHAT 
23 YOU COULD SEE ABOUT THE INSTALLATION OF THAT SIGN FROM THE 
24 INTERIOR OF THE BUILDING. YOU TOLD ME YOU COULD GET UP ON A 
25 CATWALK THAT WAS USED FOR STORE SURVEILLANCE AND THAT WOULD 
nnn"G4 

























Above i t ? 
Up here tova rc about tne top t h i r d of tr.e form 
t n e r e i s a — 
A Yes. Tnat i s n i n e . 
Q Under the word "ma te r i a l " t h a t ' s typed in a l l caps? 
A Right . Yes, i t i s . 
Q Why did you sign that? 
A Completion of tne work order. 
Q Your signature in that block means that the work to 
be done pursuant to that work order has been completed? 
A Rignt. 
Q r,7hicn copy of the mult i-copy form would Exhib i t 55 
be? 
A The b l u e . 
Q Uho wrote zhs words "pickup truck" in "under invoice 
as follows?" 
A Hike Tnompscn. 
Q After the salesclerk makes up the white copy of 
work order does it then come to you? 
A Right. 
Q And you assign the workmen to go out and do the 
work? 
A Right. 
Q Who did you assign to do this job? 
A Mike Thompson. 
^r\rk*yC-*^ 
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Q Anyoocy e l se? 
A I c a n ' t r ecognise the employee number, no. I don ' t 
know. 
Q Oh, I s ee . You're r e f e r r i n g down t h e r e unaer tne « 
i 
a l l caps "no te s" t h e r e i s a clock employee number? i 
A Rignt . • 
Q And tnen t h e r e i s two employee numbers i n c i c a t e c , 
! 
uncerneath t n a t ? j 
t 
i 
A Right . . 
Q Do you recognize one of tnose two employee numoers? j 
i 
i 
A I recognize tne top one. I 
Q Tnat's Mike Thompson? 
A Right. 
Q I s he s t i l i employed witn YESCO? 
i 
A Yes, he i s . j 
Q How, i s t n a t your s i gna tu re tna t appears j u s t t c the ! 
i 
r i g n t of tne a l l caps "notes" about two- tn i rds of tne way ccv/n ! 
t he page? 
A Yes, i t i s . 
Q What does your signature there mean? 
A It's an indication that ne filled out the clock 
tnere stating what cay he did the work and how much time was 
involved. 
C He being Mike Tnompson? 
A Righ t . 
000366 
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Q That is, he wrote in 7/2/82? 
A Rignt. 
Q Tnat means t h a t ' s the cay t h a t ne did the work 
i n d i c a t e d on t h e work order? 
A T n a t ' s the date i t was completed. 
Q I s t h a t your s i g n a t u r e t ha t appears j u s t above tne 
a l l caps "ma te r i a l t r a n s f e r number?" 
A Yes, i t i s , 
usea. 
Q What coes your s i g n a t u r e t ne re mean? 
A T n a t ' s an i n d i c a t i o n t n a t t he re was no ma te r i a l 
Q Ho m a t e r i a l usee? 
A Tnere was no m a t e r i a l used. 
Q How, i s t n a t your handwri t ing where i t says 
" r e secu reo b u i l c i n g s i g n ? " 
A No, i t i s n ' t . 
Q Who wrote t h a t ? 
A I d o n ' t know. I c o n ' t know for s u r e . 
Q Who wrote " read jus ted time c lock?" 
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Q Can ycu t a i l wnat cne w r i t i n g i s over t n e r e 
a l o n g s i d e of ens page t h a t ' s runn ing up t h e s i c e of t n e page? 
A Where a r e you r e f e r r i n g t o ? 
MR. MOHRMAK: I f he can see i t on t h a t copy , Ecb. 
BY 2IR. KENDERSCIT: 
Q Yean. Let me nana you n i n e . 
A Tna t a p p e a r s t o ce t h e d a t e t h a t t h a t work o r d e r was 
p r i c e s . We Gocument t h a t t n e oay t h a t t h e s i g n or t h a t t h e 
work o r d e r was p r i c e d o u t . I tfcir.K i t s a y s p r i c i n g and t h e n 
t n e a a t e . 
Q LOOKS l i k e about J u l y 15 tn? 
A Yean. 
Q I s p r i c i n g s o m e t n m g t n a t ' s n o r m a l l y cone a f t e r t h e 
work i s c o m p l e t e d ? 
A R i g a t . 
Q I s p r i c i n g t h e same t n m g as d e c i c i n g hew much 
y o u ' r e go ing t o b i l l t n e cus tomer fo r t h e work you p e r f o r m e d ? 
A Yes. 
Q Whose h a n d w r i t i n g i s t h e word " c o m p l e t e d ? " 
A Jiike Thompson. 
Q Can ycu t e l l from l o o k i n g a t E x h i b i t 55 or 56 who i t 
was t h a t p r e p a r e d t n e work o r d e r , s a l e s p e r s o n t h a t i s ? 
A S f t i r l e y McCandless . 
Q Hew can you t e l l on i t ? 
A V/here i t s a y s " o r d e r p r e p a r e d oy" SI1, t h e i n i t i a l s 
0003681 
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1 SJ typea i n . 
2 Q T n a t ' s Sn i r i ey IlcCanoiess? 
3 A Yes. 
4 Q I s she s t i l l employed witri Young? 
5 A Yes. 
5 Q Bo I understand you c o r r e c t l y t h a t for tne 
7 r e a d j u s t i n g of the riir.e clock and for the resecur m c of the 
8 o u i l c i n g s ign to tne bu i ld ing t h a t no m a t e r i a l s were used? 
9 A According to the work order the re was no m a t e r i a l 
10 t r a n s f e r numoer w r i t t e n i n . T h a t ' s an i n d i c a t i o n t h a t t ne re 
11 was no m a t e r i a l s usee on the j c o . 
12 Q Now, cown at tne very bottom of Exhibi t 5 5 . 
13 A Yes. 
14 Q Where it says "YESCO rep" in all caps? 
15 I A Yes. 
15 Q I/hose s i g n a t u r e s a re those? 
17 A From t h i s copy I c a n ' t t e l l . 
18 Q Does i t look l i k e Mike? 
19 A I t looks l i k e i t could be, yes . 
20 Q Any o tner one you don 1 t know? 
21 A I c o n 1 t know. 
22 Q What does block "YESCO rep" mean? 
23 A T n a t ' s t h e r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s of Young Sign Company 
24 t n a t worKed on t h i s p a r t i c u l a r j oo . 
25 Q That a c t u a l l y did the work a t the l o c a t i o n 
000363 
ED HIDGLEY e. ASSOCIATES 353-2000 14 






















A Rignt . 
Q And t h e s i g n a t u r e over t h e r e a t t n s lower r i gn t -nana 
i corner i s what? 
i A T n a t ' s the s i g n a t u r e of tr.e customer s t a t i n g t n a t 
! the joe hdu been completed to t h e i r s a t i s f a c t i o n . 
» 
J Q L e t ' s have you lock a t Exhioic 58 for j u s t a minute . 
Wnat i s i t ? 
A Okay, T h a t ' s a cost, review s t a t i n g how much time 
' was a c t u a l l y involved anc i f any m a t e r i a l s were used f whicn 
t n e r e was none. 
Q Tnis i s a Young E l e c t r i c Sign Company document? 
! A Yes, i t i s . 
i 
| Q I s i t one t h a t ' s cus tomar i ly prepared a f t e r tha 
complet ion cf tne work order? 
A Yes, i t i s . J 
Q By looking a t Exhib i t 58 can ycu now t e l l me wno tne j 
I ! 
I I 
otrier workman was t h a t you sent to the job a t tne Smi th ' s Food I 
i 
King a t 94th South and 2039 East? ! 
! 
i 
A Appears t o be Halm, J . S. That wouic be Jim Hair?. j 
Q I s ne i s s t i l l employed witn Young? I 
A Yes, he i s . I 
Q Prom looking a t Exhib i t 53 can ycu t e l l how mucn was j 
chargeG Smi tn ' s for the jco i n d i c a t e d on the work order t h a t ' s i 
I 
i 
Exh ib i t s 55 and 56? ! G00370 

























A Yes, I can. 
Q How much? 
A F o r t y - e i g n t c o l l a r s . 
Q And do you a r r i v e a t char conclusion from t h e 
handwr i t t en e n t r y "two man hours f o r t y - e i g h t ? " 
A Yes. 
Q What 's tne purpose of the e n t r i e s under tne column 
t o t a l cos t t h a t locks l i k e i t t o t a l s fo r ty -one c o l l a r s and nir 
c e n t s ? 
A Okay. T h a t ' s t oca i — t h a t ' s cur cost plus our 
cvernead. Ana tnen t n e r e i s a f i g u r e usee divided i n t o t h a t 
f i g u r e t n a t g ives us t n a t number fo r ty -one zero nine and t h a t ' s 
a f i g u r e t h a t we go by. 
Q Your t o t a l cost for labor for t n a t job was 
twenty-twe c o l l a r s ana e i g n t y - f i v e cen ts? 
A Uith overhead. 
C You mean ycu acoec overhead t o the — 
A Our t o t a l cos t without overhead i s seventeen d o l l a r s 
ana e i g h t y - f i v e c e n t s , llitn overhead i t ' s twenty-two d o l l a r s 
and e i g h t y - f i v e c e n t s . 
Q Ail r i g h t . I'm with you. Kow do you ge t to t h e 
f o r t y - o n e zero nine? 
A 22.85 i s divided oy .556 . 
Q I s t h a t decimal t h a t you j u s t s t a t e d something t h a t 
appears sonewhere on the face of t h i s document? 





























llo, i t i s no t . 
You j u s t happen to know tha t? 
R igh t . 
So t h a t l i t t l e mathematical opera t ion gives ycu the 
t o t a l f c r t y - c n e d o l l a r s and nine cents? 
A Rign t . 
Uhac ' s the s i g n i n c a n c s of the f o r t y - e n s c o l l a r s ana 
nine cen t s ? 
A 
Q 
I 3 r 
T n a t ' s to allow us to make our margins. 
OKay. T-7nat does i t mean in terms of what y o u ' r e 
going to o i l l the customer, if anything? 
A U e l i , i t ' s j u s t a f i g u r e tna t we go by t ha t we l i k e 
to see whether or not how we a re comparing with tne joe i f we 
making money or i f we a re not . Tha t ' s a l l t h a t i s , i t ' s 
j u s t an i n d i c a t i o n to l e t us knew how we are doing. 
Q Tne way y o u ' r e going to b i l l the customer was simply 
cemputea by two man hours a t what, apparent ly twenty-four 
d o l l a r s an hour for a t o t a l of f o r t y - e i g h t ? 
A R igh t . 
Q How/ do ycu see anything on Exhib i t 5 8 tha t 
i n d i c a t e s t o you t h a t you b i l i e d Smith ' s for any m a t e r i a l s for 
t h a t job? 
A No, we did no t . 
ilR. IiATTHEWS: Did I understand c o r r e c t l y you d i d n ' t 
b i l l Smi tn ' s or ycu j u s t d o n ' t see anything here t h a t would 
000372 









i n d i c a t e t n a t ? 
THE WITNESS: Ke asked if we h-c t i l i e c Smith ' s for 
any m a t e r i a l s as a i n c i c a t i o n on t h i s job cos t review and ther 
i s no i n d i c a t i o n t h a t we c i a . 
Q In f a c t , tha i n d i c a t i o n i s t h a t ycu a i c no t , r i g h t ? 
You a i c not c i i l tnem for m a t e r i a l s ? 
A RignE. V.o m a t e r i a l s were o i l l e e . 
Q J u s t l abo r? 





• Have you got E:;hioit 59 t h e r e , s i r ? 
Yes. 
that's Exhibit 5 9? 
T h a t ' s t he invoice t n a t ' s sent to the customer. 
Q In t h i s case the customer ceinc Smi th ' s? 
A Yes. 
Q For tne work performed pursuant t c the work orders 
t h a t ' s E x n i o i t s 55 and 56? 
A Righ t . 
Q h'amely, f ix ing the time clock and r e seca r ing the 
s i gn to t h e b u i l d i n g ? 
A Yes. 
Q A Eotal of f o r t y - e i g h t d o l l a r s for l abo r? 
A Yes. 
























verifies cnat the work stated on the order is to be done. Ke ! 
i 
! 
s igns tne order p r i o r to tne work, we go anead anc do t n e work, j 
j 
We go bacK in after the work is completed and he signs it ! 
i 
whether he i s s a t i s f i e d with the j c o . 
Q So ne s igns twice then? 
A Cor rec t . 
I Q And would 56 oe tne copy he s igns i n i t i a l l y and 55 
i 
I m e copy ne s igns a f te rwards? Am I jumping ahead? 
j 
I A Cor rec t . F i f t y - s i x i s tne white copy, m a c ' s tne 
f i r s t copy s igned . 
ilR. BULLOCH: I t ' s prooably no s u r p r i s e to anybody 
but tne s i g n a t u r e on the r igh t -hand side looks extremely 
s i m i l a r to t h e s i g n a t u r e of David Whist ler on a sworn staterrier 
he gave my o f f i c e . So prooaoly everybody knows t h a t , but i t ' s 
not r e a l l y t n a t c l e a r . 
IlR. KE:;DERSG:J: It's nice to hear ycu say it. : 
EY MS. WALTOM: ! 
Q And a copy of t h i s would be l e f t with the customer? j 
A C o r r e c t . ! 
» 
Q If a channel iron and through bolts had been usee to \ 
repair this sign would it show up as material? ! 
A Yes, it would. : 
i Q Do ycu know the difference in cost between using a 
lag screw into a stud and using channel iron and through colts 
if one corner of the sign had come loose? 
0003*74 
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t n a t n igh t was secured? 
A C o r r e c t . 
Q Do you know what caused that sign to fall down? 
A No, I don1 t. 
Q When you came and secured the one sign that you have 
cold us aoout, did you make an inspection of the other signs to 
make sure they were okay? 
A No, I did not. 
0 I s t h e r e a reason you d i d n ' t do t h a t ? 
A Not r e a l l y , no. 
Q Were tnere any unusual conditions tnat night sucn as 
a wine storm that ycu think may have caused this particular 
sign to come loose? 
A Mot that I can remember. 
C Now, referring your attention to Exhibit: 55, do ycu 
nave tnat in front cf ycu? 
A Yes, I do. 
Q In the box saiu "ordered by P.O. number" the name 
Dave Wnistler is typed there, GO you see that? 
A Yes, I do. 
Q Do you know"who t h a t i s ? 
A No, I donf t . 
0 He has t e s t i f i e d before in depos i t i on in t h i s case 
and he was the manager of the Smi th ' s Food Kiny s t o r e . Does 
t n a t mean t h a t ne c a l l e d up and ordered t h i s work to be cone or 
OOOIV75 
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screws and charge for them? 
A Right . We are supposed to but if we use one cr two 
c o l t s i t a i n ' t wcrtn the h a s s l e up t o know to make a m a t e r i a l 
s l i p out for i t . 
Q You would have to make out s e p a r a t e s l i p s ? 
A Oh-huh# s tu f f l i k e t h a t / so — 
Q I!r. Tnompson, in f ron t of you t h e r e i s a shee t of 
paper/ a work o r d e r , a t tne top Exhib i t 5 5 , do you recognize 
t h i s work o rde r? 
A No. I c o n ' t remember. Li.<e I say, I dia i t , I 
guess my name i s on i t , mine anc J i m ' s . Neitner cne cf us c*r. 
remember doing i t . 
Q Do you recognize any of your handwri t ing on t h i s ? 
A Right t h e r e and t h e r e ( i n d i c a t i n g ) . 
Q L e t ' s see i f you can say the words t h a t a re in ycur 
h a n c w r i t i n c . 
A "Readjusted time c ioc* . Resecured the bu i ld ing 
s ign . " 
Q And t n e r e a d j u s t e e time clock i s i n your 
handwri t ing? 
A I'm sure i t i s , yes . 
Q And the words a t the bottom of tne page f can you 
t e l l what they a re? 
A That a i n ' t my handwrit ing t h e r e . 
Q Readjusted time clock i s net your handwri t ing? 
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A No. That loc.<s l i k e n ine . 
IlR. EE::DZRSCM: Resecured bu i ld ing sign i s yours? 
THE WITNESS: Yes. 
EY liS. WALTOIJ: 
Q Are t ne words pickup truck in your handwri t ing? 
A Yes. 
Q Near the p r i n t e d words YESCO rep can you make out 
anyth ing t h e r e and t e l l whetner or not i t f s your handwri t ing? 
A Locks li.-ce mine ano J i m ' s handwri t ing t n e r e . 
Q I s t n a t your hanowrit ing? 
A Yes. I am sure t n a t i t i s . 
Q I would like you to look at Exhioit Xc. 57. Do ycu 
recall ever seeing Exhibit No. 57 before? 
A i;o. 
Q Do you recognize your hancwri t ing on Exhibi t 57? 
A Yean. I d o n ' t rememoer doing t n a t tacugn. 
Q I w i l l g ive ycu a moment to IOOK a t i t . 
A I don 1 t rememoer t n a t . 
C Could you t e l l ir*e what i s in your handwri t ing on 
E x n i b i t 57? 
A riy name here and tnen r i g h t t he re ( i n d i c a t i n g ) . 
Q Resecured bu i ld ing s i g n ; what appears t o be an 
a b b r e v i a t i o n for n u i l d m g ? 
A Un-nun. 
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A 1940 South Ilai.n, C l e a r f i e l d , Utah 34015. 
Q lir . Mai;:., rr.y nane i s P n y l l i s Ualtc.n. I r e p r e s e n t 
t h e p l a i n t i f f s i n t h i s a c t i o n . Are ycu acquainted witn the 
sub jec t mat te r of t n i s s u i t ? 
A I o e l i e v e so , yes . 
Q What's your understanding about it? ! 
j 
A I t ' s a mat ter of what the cause wes or reasoning was | 
or something on t h a t sign t h a t f e l l down, the Smith ' s s i g n . [ 
Q Do you know where t h a t Smi th ' s s ign was? ! 
i 
A I do net knew an a d d r e s s , no. i 
Q Have you ever been t o the Smith ' s s t c r e on 94th j 
Soutn and aoout 20en East in Sandy? j 




t h e r e ? 
Have you been t h e r e more than once? 
Mot t o my knowledge. 
Could ycu t e l i us abouc tne one time you have been 
A I cannot . I d o n ' t remember the t ime. I know I was 
t h e r e because my name was on a form t h a t a work order t h a t I 
had been t h e r e but I d o n ' t remember being t h e r e . 
Q How leng have you worked for YESCO? 
A Five and a ha l f y e a r s . 
Q What i s your c u r r e n t p o s i t i o n ? 
A Foreman. 





\K AT: P i t h ' s Ttaod Klrir 
B L B C T R I C S I G H c o m p a n y 
DATEJulv 1. l f l g
 CUST. PH0NE JM2r2nn2 
2C?X Dist D&M South 
TATE. S 'mHy^ V-inU ZIP. 




ACTUAL COMP, DATE 
NEW CUSTOMER 
PREV. CUSTOMER 
BILL TO Srdth's I'anfi'wrat. ^H0?.7J 
ADORESS IPSO South RrHtoTvy! rtoari 
CITY A STATE - c . , 7 t T ^ . p Q j ^ ^ r i p T _ ZIP p : r < . 
TERRITORY 
11 
/ "^' -> 21 
LABOR 






PRIME COST OVERHEAD 
\ ' ':' ' 
TYPE 
YESCO AUTHORIZATION 
TOTAL PRIME COST 
/ 
^V^Jfv ; v i^t% 
NATION OF WORK TO BE PERFURMED AND GOODS SOLD: 
Tire c lod, i s net tiirnin^ off 
C27IAC7 asiWCT BITOn: I»I;73 A:.Y WTPil ns he wnnts to lzicv lxxv to *?•-! c lod:. 
He-secure builriiiij- s i p : . 
INVOICE AS FOLLOWS: 
//C X M/^ Tfr v, O K 
T r. r. 




1 \ i t *£ 
/ 
' / ' 
[ 0 M f j k/j [%A 
L I 
OFFICIAL U* I ONLY J&*A-<aMC*&(*/ X V o ^ 
>>r,. . / ! '<£ ' 
[ M A T ^ A C TRANSFER NO j **/£/>vr^ x? ^ ^/ S / 
ACCEPTANCE 
THIS IS TO CERTIFY that our SIGN has been installed D Painted D Serviced O In accordance with our request. We 
hereby accept the lign and/or other work as indicated above as completed in a satisiacfory and workmanlike manner. 
DATE 
.7--J- Z _ 
n 0 0 3 <** 
[®jl) younG BLBCTRIC SIGR compon: 
HBSCO
 DATP July 1. 1982 j t m PHONE 942-2332 
•I WORK AT:. 
3RESS 
Smith's Ibod King BILL TO: S m i t h ' s Manaffgrnpnt 
2039 East 9400 South 
Y&STATE Sanfo, Utah _ 2 I P . 






ADDRESS _ 1550 South Redrood fipad 








EST. COMP. DATE ACTUAL COMP. DATE EST. CASH SALE PRICE ORDER PREPARED BY CREDIT APPROVAL YESCOAUTHORtZAT, 
7-JL-F2- Sm 
LABOR MATERIAL PRIME COST OVER ^ EAD7>/-J?Z— p 2 ^ . TOTAL PRIME COST 
'LANATION OF WORK TO BE PERFORMED AND GOODS SOLD: 
Time clock i s not turning off 
OCKrACr CUSTOMER BEFORE DOING ANY ORK as he wants to knew bow to se t clock. 
Re-secure building s ign. 
INVOICE AS FOLLOWS: 
T & M 
CASH SALE PRICE 
PERMITS 











THIS ORDER IS SUBJECT TO TERMS AND CONDITIONS ON REVERSE SIDE. 
The undersigned Buyer hereby orders the goods end services described above end Young Electrician Comotny agrees to furnish, perform tnd sell the same for the \ 
shown above and on the terms and conditions which are set forth on the reverse s»de hereof and Incorporated herein by relerence 
SALESMAN 
ACCEPTED FOR YOUNG ELECTRIC SIGN CO. BY 
PERSONALLY GUARANTEED BY THE UNDERS 
ofeO 
SMITH'S MANAGEMENT CORP. 
5520 So. Van Winkle 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84117 
STORE WORK ORDER 
All labor and materials furnished on flirt work avthorization will not 
exceed $ 3 0 0 . To exceed this fimit specific avthorizatvon most fee 
obtained from the Facility tnqmttring Department. a j f j 
Avtfiorization to exceed limit aoprored by




NUMBER ON INVOICE 
/T* 
NUMBER OF MEN . . . . : / / . DATE ?•?-?< TIME 
COMPLAIN! 












WORK ACCEPTED BY 
SERVICEMAN'S SIGNATURE 





' • & * * 
-. ratify *^yu&y£) 
hO%lh 2?-90- i 
5 9 * 2 2 
5 9 * 2 2 
5^ *22 
0 0 * 5 
0 0 * 5 
00*5 
--
HOiVfl - I f l t t 3 i t n 
5 9 * A t 
S 9 * U 
S 9 * M 
96#v>l 
6 9 * 9 
— • - -




S 2 0 - A u0 # 
i 2 0 - 1 on 0 






2 * - *u -x 
• -
Q u - 1 0 - I 
nDlVb o O n f l x $ # 1 3 i t o 
3 l f ( i u l tf I t i M i • 
. •OISIA1U 3 x * j wx $ I fxux 
oOtfVI i d A l b o i S l U o i 
•UKd^CHx 151 
• ±903 " * f iO l" 
9C 2 9 - 6 0 - 1 
Of3HH3ACT* 
3 3 I A * 3 9 \Z 
4903 i n « x t N A903 bOJVl 
XN3M39V.«fH SiHi lHW «»b£6 CJ uOl 
xd3Q* • 3 i v g - -9XK"icr - SMK 4J3J~* • *"* 3M TO 3 3 A C I J M 3 urr u v r l * 
J$30 1|ltt3xVin OS U J O A S AXil*«ti iO 
0996£6 ON *Or M3IA3II 9.-J1160J JUT Ana i*n xifS A.i<d..CJ *.'JxS J i d l J j U 
All overdue payments shall bear interest at the rate 
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' - i i 
, t 
*» * 
•C INVOICE NO 
:.L:i>'16221 
gMTTH'S lOUttGBHEMT 
1550 South Jtodwood load 
S a l t Ukm C i t y , trt*b *4104 
» > 0 * 0 CU1TO»fft*0 CUt'OMt«P>0*0 ©• 0 * D ( « 1 D I T 
7-15-82 7-1*82 91988 #0000 temt WhfgfUr 
DESCRIPTION 
Tt»* ' tO«* t A l t * " * * * C0C» 
li is a-i 
PRICE AMOUNT 
FOR W08K AT J SHTXHfS FOOD ZZ9G 
2039 Ka*t 9400 Sooth 
Handy, Ptah 
Labor t o • s i g n and chock t i j w c lock 48.00 
«V«yJ total 
PLEASE MAKE PAYMENT FROM THIS INVOICE 
DUPLICATE INVOICE TERMS: NET CASH DUE ON RECEIPT OF INVOICE. 
114 I I MUM) 12-60 
$48.00 
TOTAL DUE 





















0 Ivei l , I'm locking a : a se rv ice order m a t ' s dated 
January 5/ 1984. Apparently the work was cone en January 9, 
1934 by you and Terry Se::ton. I'm wondering what your job was 
witn YESCO a t chat t i n e . 
A Okay. I was Terry Sexton ' s he lper en t he t r u c k . 
Q Whan was Terry — i s i t S:;:ion or Sexton? 
A Sexton. 
C What was h i s 30b i : t h a t time? 
A He was tne lead man on the t ruck . And 
p a r t i c u l a r time he was ass ignee t c be r e spons ib l e for the j ob . 
C Have you s ince then oeen promoted so you a r e more cr 
l e s s t h e l e e c person? 
A Righ t . Since then I have been promoted. I am the 
leau man on a t ruck new a t the present t ime. 
0 What coec Terry do now? 
A Terry at t n i s p a r t i c u l a r time i s working i n s i d e tne 
shop a t t h i s p a r t i c u l a r t ime. 
Q Let me show you Exhib i t 35 whicn i s two pages . I'm 
snowin^ you where i t ' s opened to the f i r s t page. P lease look 
a t t h a t page and a l so the next page which c o n s i s t s of two time 
c a r d s . Take as much time as you want t o . Have you seen these 
oef cire? 
MR. nCHRI-IAN: Look a t the time card f i r s t before you 
answer. This one h e r e . 
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3Y HR. 3ULL0CIC: 
Q You have seen them before? 
A Yes. 
Q Die you lock a t then in p repa ra t ion for your 
d e p o s i t i o n ? 
A No. 
Q tJhen do you remember seeing these th ings ce fc re? 
A I r ecogn i se them. They ' re a regula r se rv ice order 
anc d a i l y s e r v i c e order t n a t we do work, you knew, every Ccy we 
see then every cay. Time cardj a re seen every day. 
C Co you remember an occasion in January of 19cM when 
ycu and Terry Se::ton went to the S n i t n ' s Fooc King s t o r e a t 
9400 South ana acout 2Cth East? 
A I d o n ' t r e c a l l t h i s p a r t i c u l a r date being, ycu knew, 
being t h e r e , cut in looking a t c n i s , ycu know, i t appears tnat: 
we were t n e r e but I d o n ' t r e c a l l . 
C So tne documents would i n d i c a t e i t . You have no 
reason t o q u a r r e l with the documents? 
A Ho. 
Q 3ut as far as in your own mind having a memory of 
what happened do ycu have a memory of v i s i t i n g t r .a t s t o r e and 
doing any work? 
A I don1 t remember. 
Q In case i t may help ycu remember, we have got seme 
























you Exhibit: 3 5 , pnoco^raph CP.C, SO wn-2re tr.e arrow i s i s t he ; 
s icn thac we e r e ca lk ing aoouz. The sign i s not tr.ere any mors | 
in tne p i c t u r e , i s i t ? ! 
MR. EE:;DE^S01I: Or anywhere e l s e , I might add. 
MR. BULLOCK: You might . 
2Y iiR. BULLOCK: 
C Does tnat he lp ycu rememcer ever working on t h a t 
s ign? 
A P o s s i b l y , yes . And :nat p a r t i c u l a r day I d o n ' t 
r e c a l l , ycu know, p a r t i c u l a r l y working on t n a t , ycu know. 
There i s many s i g n s , tne Smi th ' s s ign , and I d o n ' t remember, 
ywU Knew, p a r t i c u l a r l y working on any p a r t i c u l a r sign or what I 
d id on a p a r t i c u l a r day. 
C So the p i c t u r e s r e a l l y don f t help? 
A Nc. 
Q ITcuid ycu tu rn back t o t h i r t y - s i x . The h a n c w r i t m g 
wmen says " r e p a i r w i r ing , cheo : out a l l s i g n s , " whose 
handwri t ing i s t h a t ? 
A Terry Se::ton. 
Q Do ycu have an understanding about what was 
customarily meant in your work by check out a sign? What did 
it mean? 
A Ho. Locking over it, repairing wiring and checking 
out all signs, that would moan to me that we inspect the wiring-
inside the sign and cleared, you know, some shorts and checked 


























EXAM BY BULLOCK 
MR. HENDERSON: HAVE YOU GOT EXTRA COPIES OF 
THOSE EXHIBITS? LET'S GO OFF THE RECORD. 
(WHEREUPON, A DISCUSSION WAS HAD OFF THE 
RECORD; AFTER WHICH, THE FOLLOWING PROCEEDINGS 
CONTINUED:) 
MR. BULLOCK: BACK ON THE RECORD. DO YOU KNOW 
WHO THE INDIVIDUALS ARE WHO DO THE PATROL? I GUESS I SHOULD 
ASK YOU: IS IT BROKEN DOWN BY THE PART OF THE COUNTY OR 
THE PART OF THE CITY, IF YOU KNOW? 
A NO, I DON'T KNOW. 
Q YOU JUST KNOW THERE IS SOME PATROL. 
A YES. 
Q IF I WANTED TO FIND OUT MORE ABOUT THE PATROL, 
WHO WOULD I ASK? 
A YOU WOULD PROBABLY ASK KEN ANDERSON. HE'S THE 
SUPERVISOR OVER THE SERVICE CREW. 
Q IS THERE A SUPERVISOR OF THE INSTALLATION CREW? 
A YES, RICH LEATHERMAN. 
Q DO YOU KNOW HOW LONG KEN AND RICH HAVE EACH HAD 
THE JOBS THEY HAVE NOW? 
A NO, I DON'T. 
Q DID THEY HAVE THEM WHEN YOU CAME TO WORK? 
A YES. 
Q DO YOU REMEMBER AN OCCASION IN EARLY NOVEMBER OR 
IT LOOKS LIKE NOVEMBER 12TH OF 1984 WHEN YOU PARTICIPATED IN 
OtNtBAl COUOT a t » 0 * T l M 
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EXAM BY BULLOCK 
SOME WORK ON A SIGN AT THE SMITH'S FOOD KING STORE AT 9<*00 
SOUTH IN SALT LAKE? 
A- YES. 
Q DO YOU HAVE A RECOLLECTION OF THAT? 
A YES. 
Q WHAT HAPPENED? 
A WELL, WE WENT TO THE LOCATION. WE NEEDED—THERE 
WAS SOME OUTAGE IN THE SIGN, SO I WENT UP AND TURNED THE 
TIME CLOCK ON AND TERRY WENT UP AND WORKED ON IT. 
Q YOU AND TERRY WERE THE ONES WHO WORKED ON IT ON 
THAT OCCASION? 
A YES. 
Q ANYBODY ELSE? 
A NO. 
Q IS IT YOUR UNDERSTANDING THAT THIS SERVICE ORDER 
GOT GIVEN TO TERRY SEXTON? 
A RIGHT. 
Q THEN HE GRABBED YOU AND SAID, "LET'S GO," OR 
SOMETHING? 
A YEAH. 
Q WHERE IT'S WRITTEN—LET'S SAY THE TYPED PORTION 
THAT SAYS, "THE WEST END OF THE BUILDING SIGN IS OUT," 
WOULD THAT HAVE BEEN TYPED IN BY THE SECRETARY? 
A YES. 
Q AND WHERE IT'S HANDWRITTEN, "COMPLETE," DO YOU KNOW 
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EXAM BY BULLOCK 
NEW LAMPS AND THEY DON'T WORK, THEN WE CHECK THE BALLASTS. 
Q DO YOU KNOW WHAT THE NUMBERS UNDER, "INSTALLATION" 
LET'S SEE, DOES IT SAY "INSTALL"? WHAT'S WRITTEN AFTER, 
"INSTALLED," IF YOU CAN READ IT? 
A " INSTALL"—. 
Q IF YOU KNOW. I DON'T WANT YOU TO GUESS. I 
THOUGHT MAYBE YOU MIGHT HAVE KNOWN. 
A "INSTALL BALLAST;" THAT'S ALL I KNOW. 
Q DO YOU KNOW WHAT THE NUMBERS BELOW THAT REFER TO? 
A YES, THOSE ARE THE SIZE OF THE BALLASTS. 
Q DOES IT INDICATE TWO BALLASTS? 
A YES. 
Q FURTHER OVER ON THE LEFT IT SAYS, "MATERIAL 
TRANSFER NUMBER." DO YOU KNOW WHAT THOSE NUMBERS MEAN? 
A THAT'S THE MATERIAL SLIP ON THE THIRD PAGE. 
Q I S E E . 
A ON THE TOP. 
Q SO IF IT HADN'T GOTTEN CHOPPED OFF, PROBABLY THE 
THIRD PAGE UP IN THE RIGHTHAND CORNER WOULD SAY, "113277?" 
A RIGHT. 
Q I GUESS EACH EMPLOYEE HAS AN EMPLOYEE NUMBER? 
A YES. 
Q YOURS IS 350? 
A YES. 
Q THE SECOND PAGE OF EXHIBIT 38 , THEN, WOULD BE 
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EXAM BY BULLOCK 
TIME CARDS FOR YOU AND TERRY; IS THAT RIGHT? 
A YES. 
WHAT IS AN OPERATION CODE, IS IT 15.1? 
YES, THAT'S A MAINTENANCE CONTRACT. 
DO YOU KNOW WHAT DEPARTMENT AREA CODE 5 MEANS? 
THAT'S ELECTRICAL. 
LET'S MOVE NOW TO EXHIBIT 35 WHICH CONSISTS OF 
SEVEN PAGES. I WON'T BE ASKING YOU ABOUT ALL OF THEM, I 
DON'T THINK, BUT YOU'RE FREE TO GLANCE AT ALL OF THEM AND 
BECOME FAMILIAR WITH THEM. 
NOW, LOOKING AT THE FIRST PAGE OF EXHIBIT 35, 
THIS PHOTOGRAPH NO. 2 APPEARS TO BE THE LOCATION OVER THE 
DOOR OF THE SMITH'S FOOD KING WHERE THAT SIGN WAS WHEN YOU 
WORKED ON IT? 
A YES. 
Q YOU INDICATED ONE OF THE FIRST THINGS YOU DID 
WHEN YOU GOT THERE WAS TO TURN THE TIME CLOCK ON? 
A RIGHT. 
Q NOW I'M GUESSING THAT YOU WENT DURING THE DAYTIME, 
AND YOU WANTED TO SEE HOW THE THING LIT UP AT NIGHT, SO YOU 
TURNED THE TIME CLOCK ON TO NIGHT; IS THAT RIGHT? 
A NOW I DIDN'T UNDERSTAND WHAT YOU MEAN. 
Q WHY DID YOU TURN THE TIME CLOCK ON? 
A DURING THE DAY IT WAS—I DON'T KNOW WHAT TIME IT 
WAS. IT WAS JUST DURING THE DAY SOMETIME. 




































EXAM BY HENDERSON 
Q YOU HAVE SEEN THE ORIGINAL ONE OF THESE FORMS? 
A YES. 
Q OKAY. SO WHEN THE SERVICE PEOPLE GET A SERVICE 
ORDER, IS THE BOTTOM PART OF THE SERVICE ORDER FILLED OUT 
OR NOT? 
A AFTER I T ' S DONE, AFTER WE'VE DONE THE WORK. 
Q I SEE. THIS PART AT THE BOTTOM THEN IS A METHOD 
BY WHICH THE GUY WHO PREPARES THE SERVICE ORDER CAN KEEP 
A HANDLE ON WHETHER THE WORK'S ACTUALLY PERFORMED? 
A RIGHT. 
Q ALL RIGHT. AND THEN THE TIME CARDS ARE WHAT'S 
FILLED OUT BY THE GUYS WHO ACTUALLY DO THE WORK INDICATED 
ON THE SERVICE ORDERS? 
A RIGHT. 
Q NOW EXHIBIT NO. 36 DOES NOT HAVE A MATERIAL 
TRANSFER FORM, BUT EXHIBIT 38 DOES. IS THERE SOME REASON 
THAT EXHIBIT 36 DOESN'T HAVE A MATERIAL TRANSFER FORM? 
A WHAT THEY DO—IF THEY DIDN'T USE ANY MATERIAL, ALL 
THEY DID WAS REPAIR THE WIRING. 
Q I SEE. NOW WHO WOULD FILL OUT THE MATERIAL 
TRANSFER FORM IF ANY IS NEEDED AT THE JOB; THE PERSON WHO 
ACTUALLY PERFORMED THE WORK? 
A YES. 
Q THEN WHAT HAPPENS AFTER THE WORK IS ACTUALLY 
PERFORMED AND THE TIME CARD'S FILLED OUT AND THE MATERIAL 
Of NfftAl COUNT * f *0«TCR3 































EXAM BY HENDERSON 
TRANSFER CARD IS FILLED OUT, ALL THAT'S RETURNED BACK TO THE 
PERSON WHO FILLED. OUT THE SERVICE ORDER? 
A YES. 
Q THEN THE SERVICE ORDER PERSON COMPLETES THE 
SERVICE ORDER DOWN AT THE BOTTOM? 
A YES. 
Q IS THAT THE WAY IT WORKS? 
A THEY WRITE ALL THIS, AND HE WRITES HIS NAME AND 
TURNS IT IN. 
Q YOU'RE REFERRING NOW TO THE BOTTOM OF DEPOSITION 
EXHIBIT NO. 36? 
A YES. 
Q NOW REFERRING YOU TO THE TOP PART OF THE FIRST PAGE 
OF DEPOSITION EXHIBIT 36, HAVE YOU EVER SEEN THAT WRITING 
BEFORE TODAY? 
A NO. 
Q THAT IS THE "SHIRLEY" THAT'S CHECKED? 
A I HAVEN'T SEEN IT. THIS IS THE GUY THAT WORKED 
BEFORE, THIS IS SOMEONE ELSE^ S WRITING. 
Q I UNDERSTAND. SO YOU DON'T KNOW ANYTHING ABOUT 
WHAT THESE NUMBERS HERE ABOVE "1981" MEAN? 
A NO. 
Q LET ME SHOW .YOU WHAT'S BEEN MARKED AS DEPOSITION 
EXHIBIT NO. kO. HAVE YOU EVER SEEN THIS BEFORE? 
A NO. 
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EXAM BY HENDERSON 
Q DO YOU KNOW WHAT IT IS? 
A NO. 
Q I'LL SHOW YOU WHAT'S BEEN MARKED AS DEPOSITION 
EXHIBIT NO. kl. HAVE YOU EVER SEEN THIS BEFORE? 
A NO. 
Q I'LL SHOW YOU WHAT'S BEEN MARKED AS DEPOSITION 
EXHIBIT NO. *»2. HAVE YOU EVER SEEN IT BEFORE? 
A NO. 
Q DO YOU KNOW WHETHER DEPOSITION EXHIBIT NO. <*2 GOES 
WITH WHAT IS DEPOSITION EXHIBIT NO. kl} THAT IS, THAT IT'S 
PART OF THE SAME DOCUMENT? 
A NO. 
Q YOU DON'T KNOW? 
A NO. 
Q WAS THERE A CONTRACT NUMBER BETWEEN YESCO AND 
SMITH'S FOOD KING PRIOR TO CONTRACT NO. 92038-15? 
A NO, I DON'T KNOW. I DON'T KNOW. 
Q WHEN DID YOU START TO WORK FOR YESCO? 
A '83, JUNE OF '83. 
Q AND IS IT TRUE THAT THE ONLY TIME YOU WERE EVER 
TO THE SMITH'S FOOD KING AT 9<tTH SOUTH WAS IN CONNECTION 
WITH THE WORK PERFORMED ON ABOUT NOVEMBER 12TH, 198<f? 
A YES. 
Q HAVE YOU EVER BEEN TO THAT LOCATION—THAT IS, THE 
SMITH'S FOOD KING AT 9<*00 SOUTH—FOR ANY OTHER PURPOSE OTHER 
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EXAM BY BULLOCK 
A JUST BRIEFLY, JUST FROM BEING ON THE CREW. I NEVER 
HAVE WORKED WITH HIM. 
Q WERE YOU A HELPER ON ROTATION FROM THE TIME YOU 








WHAT DID YOU DO BEFORE YOU WERE A HELPER? 
I STARTED AS A FORKLIFT DRIVER FOR ABOUT NINE MONTHS. 
AND THEN YOU WENT ON ROTATION? 
YES. 
I ' L L SHOW YOU EXHIBIT NO. 37 . IT CONSISTS OF THREE 
PAGES. PLEASE TAKE A MINUTE OR TAKE WHATEVER TIME YOU NEED 
TO READ THE THREE PAGES AND THEN I ' L L ASK YOU SOME QUESTIONS 
ABOUT I T . OKAY? 
A YES. 
Q NOW IS THE FIRST PAGE WHAT'S CALLED, "SERVICE ORDER"? 
A YES. 
Q HOW IS THAT SERVICE ORDER CREATED? 
A THIS ONE WAS CREATED FROM A PATROL. IT SAYS RIGHT 
THERE, "CONTACTED BY PATROL." 
Q AND IS IT TRUE THAT THERE'S A PROCEDURE AT YESCO 
FOR PATROLS TO BE MADE ON SOME SORT OF BASIS, AND IF THEY 
SEE A PROBLEM, THEY RADIO IT IN? 
A A LIGHTING PROBLEM, YEAH, BECAUSE THEY DO IT DURING 
THE NIGHT. 
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EXAM BY BULLOCK 
1 FOR YOU AND LEE BREEZE; IS THAT RIGHT? 
8 II A YES. 
3 Q AND DO THEY SHOW THAT THE TWO OF YOU PERFORMED SOME 
4 WORK AT THE SMITH'S FOOD KING ON AUGUST 20, 198U? 
8 A YES. 
fl 11 Q AND WHAT IS THE THIRD PAGE OF THE EXHIBIT? 
7 A A LIST OF MATERIAL TRANSFER SLIP THAT'S THE MATERIAl 
8 WE USED ON THE JOB. 
0 I! Q SO IF MATERIALS ARE USED, THEN YOU DO THE 
10 TRANSFER SLIP TO KIND OF KEEP TRACK OF WHAT'S BEEN DONE OR 
11 WHAT'S BEEN USED? 
12 A THE STOCK THAT COMES OFF THE TRUCK. 
13 Q DO YOU HAVE A RECOLLECTION OF DOING SOME WORK AT 
14 THE SMITH'S FOOD KING AT 9^00 SOUTH AND ABOUT 23RD EAST IN 
IB SALT LAKE ON OR ABOUT AUGUST 20TH OF »8«+? 
18 MR. MOHRMAN: YOU HAVE TO ANSWER AUDIBLY. 
17 A NO, I CAN'T. I CAN'T REMEMBER ANYTHING ABOUT IT. 
18 I DON'T. 
19 Q THAT'S UNDERSTANDABLE, I THINK. I'LL SHOW YOU 
80 EXHIBIT 35. I'LL REPRESENT TO YOU THAT PHOTOGRAPH NO. 1 HERE 
81 SHOWS THE FRONT OF THAT STORE MINUS A SIGN WHICH WAS LOCATED 
22 ABOUT WHERE THE YELLOW ARROW IS. 
*3 A YES. 
8 4
 Q PHOTOGRAPH NO. 2 SHOWS A MORE CLOSE-UP VIEW OF WHERE 
2 8
 THE SIGN HAD BEEN LOCATED RIGHT ABOVE THE DOORS. 
Oifcf HAt. COVWT «t*0«TtMS 
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EXAM BY BULLOCK 
THERE MIGHT HAVE BEEN SOME CONSTRUCTION GOING ON 
IN ABOUT THE SUMMER OF 198»», IF THAT HELPS YOUR MEMORY AT 
ALL. AFTER LOOKING AT THESE, DO YOU HAVE ANY RECOLLECTION OF 
DOING ANY WORK THERE? 
A NO. 
Q GOING BACK TO EXHIBIT 37 , IS THERE ANY WRITING BY 
YOU ON THE FIRST PAGE? 
A YEAH. 
WHAT PART IS WRITTEN BY YOU? 
EVERYTHING ON THERE THAT'S BEEN WROTE. 
IN HANDWRITING? 
YES. 
YOU CAN RECOGNIZE YOUR OWN HANDWRITING? 
YES. 
UNDER, "MATERIAL DESCRIPTION," IS THAT/ "REPLACED"? 
ON THIS PAGE HERE? 
YES. 
UNDER THAT, "MATERIAL DESCRIPTION," I T ' S THE NUMBER 
ON THE MATERIAL TRANSFER SLIP OFF OF THIS BACK PAGE. 
MR. MOHRMAN: HE'S ASKING WHAT THIS WORD RIGHT 
HERE SAYS. 
A OH, THAT'S, "REPLACED," YES. 
Q AND THERE'S THREE SEPARATE ENTRIES. WHAT DO THEY 
STAND FOR? 
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EXAM BY BULLOCK 
SECOND ONE IS A 64-INCH COOL WHITE LAMP. THE THIRD ONE IS 
A 42-INCH COOL WHITE LAMP. 
Q UP ABOVE WHERE I T ' S TYPED THERE IS A SECOND TYPE-IN 
UNDER, "EXPLANATION OF WORK TO BE PERFORMED." DO YOU HAVE 
AN UNDERSTANDING OF WHAT IT SAYS OR WHAT IT MEANS? 
A YES. 
Q WHAT IS THAT UNDERSTANDING? 
A JUST THAT IT READS, "THE SMITHS CAN WEST END IS 
OUT ON THE S/F BUILDING SIGN," ON THE SINGLE FACE. 
Q WHAT DOES "CAN" MEAN? 
A I T ' S A SHORTCUT FOR SAYING THE SIGN. WE CALL THEM 
A CAN, BECAUSE THEY'RE MADE OF STEEL. THEY CALL THEM A CAN. 
ANY TIME A SIGN THAT'S BUILT LIKE THAT, ONE SINGLE 
FACE, IS CALLED A CAN. I T ' S JUST AN EXPRESSION. 
Q THIS WOULD TELL YOU THAT THE WEST SIDE OF THE SIGN 
WAS NOT LIGHTING? 
A YES. 
Q AND " S / F " MEANS "SINGLE FACE"? 
A YES. 
Q IF YOU WERE TO TAKE THIS DESCRIPTION AND GO OUT 
TO THE SMITH'S FOOD KING STORE, WOULD YOU EXPECT THIS 
DESCRIPTION TO PERTAIN TO THE SIGN WHOSE OUTLINE IS THERE BUT 
THE SIGN IS MISSING? 
A I F THAT'S THE ONLY ONE THAT SAYS, "SMITH'S," I 
WOULD HAVE. 
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EXAM BY BULLOCK 
Q IF A SIGN HAD BEEN PLACED UP AGAINST THE WALL AS IT 
APPEARS IN PHOTOGRAPH NO. 2 OF EXHIBIT NO. 35, IS THAT WHAT 
YOU WOULD CALL A SINGLE FACE BUILDING SIGN? 
A YES. 
Q AFTER LOOKING AT PAGES 1 , 2 , AND 3 OF EXHIBIT NO. 37, 
CAN YOU TELL ME WHAT THEY SHOW ABOUT WHAT WORK WAS DONE TO 
A SIGN ON THAT DATE? 
A YES, IT SAYS THAT WE REPLACED FOUR LAMPS ON THE 
SINGLE FACE BUILDING SIGN THAT DAY. 
Q DO YOU HAVE ANY REASON TO BELIEVE THAT THAT WAS NOT 
DONE? 
A NO, I DON'T HAVE ANY REASON TO BELIEVE THAT. 
Q YOU JUST, IF I UNDERSTAND IT RIGHT, DO SO MUCH OF 
THIS THAT YOU JUST DON'T HAVE A PARTICULAR MEMORY OF THIS 
PARTICULAR JOB; IS THAT RIGHT? 
A THAT'S RIGHT. 
Q BUT YOU DON'T QUARREL WITH THE RECORDS TO THE 
EXTENT THEY SAY THAT IT WAS DONE? 
A YEAH, IT SAYS HERE THAT I DID IT. 
Q WHAT DO YOU CALL THOSE FOUR—LIGHTBULBS, ARE THEY? 
A THEY'RE LAMPS, YES. 
Q FLUORESCEINS? 
A YES. 
Q THE LAST PAGE OF EXHIBIT 35 IS A MECHANICAL DRAWING 
OF THE SIGN WHICH FELL FROM THE SPOT WHERE IT HAD BEEN 
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THAT IS, HE ROTATES ALSO? 
YES. 
HAVE YOU EVER DONE OTHER JOBS FOR YOUNG ASIDE FROM 
THE ONE THAT YOU HAVE JUST DESCRIBED? 
A NO. 
Q CAN YOU TELL ME FROM MEMORY DURING WHAT PERIODS OF 
TIME YOU WERE DOING THE VARIOUS WORK THAT YOU WOULD ROTATE TO? 
A INSTALLATION WHEN I WAS ON THERE. I CAN'T REMEMBER 
QUITE THE DATE OF IT, BUT I WAS IN WENDOVER FOR ABOUT THREE 
MONTHS PUTTING THE SIGNS UP THERE. 
SERVICE, I HAVEN'T SPENT TOO MUCH TIME THERE, BECAUSE 
I BROKE MY LEG AND WAS OFF FOR FOUR MONTHS DURING THAT, SO 
IT'S KIND OF HARD. I'VE BEEN KIND OF SCATTERED IN BETWEEN 
THEM ALL. 
Q LET ME SHOW YOU EXHIBIT NO. 37 AND THEN I'LL ASK 
YOU SOME QUESTIONS ABOUT IT. WOULD YOU TAKE A MINUTE AND LOOK 
AT IT, IF YOU HAVE NOT ALREADY? IT CONSISTS OF THREE PAGES. 
I'D LIKE YOU TO LOOK AT EACH ONE OF THEM. 
EXHIBIT 37 PERTAINS TO SOME WORK THAT WAS DONE 
ON AUGUST 20TH OF 198U; IS THAT RIGHT? 
A YES, SIR. 
Q AND THE WORK WAS DONE AT THE SMITH'S FOOD KING ON 
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EXAM BY BULLOCK 
9<+TH SOUTH.AND 32RD EAST IN SANDY; IS THAT CORRECT? 
A YES, SIR. 
Q AND I'LL SHOW YOU EXHIBIT NO. 35, AND PARTICULARLY 
THE FIRST PAGE OF IT. PHOTOGRAPH NO. I SHOWS A YELLOW ARROW 
WHERE THE SIGN WAS LOCATED, AND I'LL REPRESENT TO YOU THAT 
THAT WAS THE SIGN THAT THIS WORK INVOLVED. 
AND PHOTOGRAPH NO. 2 SHOWS A CLOSER PICTURE OF 
WHERE THE SIGN WAS. DO YOU HAVE A RECOLLECTION OF PARTICI-
PATING IN SOME WORK ON THAT SIGN? 
A I SURE DON'T. 
Q DO YOU HAVE ANY REASON TO QUARREL WITH THE 
ACCURACY OF THE RECORDS WHICH COMPRISE EXHIBIT 37? 
A NO. 
Q WHY IS IT YOU DON'T HAVE A MEMORY OF WORKING ON 
THIS SIGN? 
A I WORK ON AN AWFUL LOT OF SIGNS DURING THE YEARS, 
AND I JUST DON'T HAVE ANY RECOLLECTION OF WORKING ON THIS 
SIGN. 
1 SEE THAT MY NAME IS DOWN ON HERE FOR DOING SOME 
SERVICE WORK, REPLACING SOME LIGHT BULBS, BUT OTHER THAN THAT 
I DON'T REMEMBER WORKING ON IT. 
Q IN AUGUST OF 1984, WERE YOU IN THE ROTATION THAT 
YOU'VE TOLD US ABOUT?- WERE YOU DOING OUTSIDE SERVICE WORK? 
A YES, SIR. 
Q AND WERE YOU WORKING WITH RANDY LAMBERT? 
M M C U t COUOT K P 0 4 T E AS 
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1 j A SERVICE, SIGN SERVICE. 
2 i Q LET ME SHOW YOU EXHIBIT 35, WHICH IS A 
3 i SERIES OF PICTURES OF THE SMITH'S FOOD KING STORE 
4 ! AT 9<tTH SOUTH AND 20TH EAST IN SANDY, UTAH. 
5 ! A YES . 
6 i Q NOW, THIS LAWSUIT CONCERNS A SIGN THAT 
7 ' WAS LOCATED ABOVE THE DOOR AS IS SHOWN IN PHOTO NO. 1 
8 ' OF EXHIBIT 35, AND THAT SIGN FELL ON JANUARY 5, 1985, 
9 I AND STRUCK A MAN AND INJURED HIM, AND HE DIED. YOU 
10 CAN SEE THE OUTLINE OF THE SIGN. IT HAD A CROWN AT 
11 THE TOP. ALSO SOME OF THE OTHER PICTURES SHOW THE 
12 ' SIGN, ALTHOUGH IT HAS SNOW ON IT, AND IT'S BEEN 
13 • BROKEN. 
14 A YES. 
15 | Q YESCO HAS PRODUCED SERVICE ORDERS FOR TWO 
16 ' OCCASIONS WHICH INDICATE SOME WORK BY YOU ON THAT 
17 j SIGN? 
18 j A YES . 
19 | Q OR AT LEAST T H A T ' S SUGGESTED. I DON'T 
i 
20 j WANT TO INDICATE IT'S CONCLUSIVE. ONE WOULD HAVE 
21 I BEEN IN JANUARY OF 198** AS SHOWN ON EXHIBIT 36? 
22 A YES . 
23 Q AND THERE ARE TIME CARDS ATTACHED TO 
24 EXHIBIT 36? 
25 A RIGHT. 





























Q THE OTHER OCCASION WOULD HAVE BEEN IN 
NOVEMBER OF 1984 AS SHOWN ON EXHIBIT 38, RIGHT? 
A YES. THAT WAS MATERIAL USED. 
MR. BULLOCK: THE WITNESS IS REFERRING TO 
THE LAST PAGE OF EXHIBIT 33 WHERE IT SAYS "MATERIAL 
TRANSFER." 
Q (BY MR. BULLOCK) MY QUESTION IS, DO YOU 
HAVE A RECOLLECTION OF GOING TO THE SMITH'S STORE 
AND PERFORMING WORK ON THOSE TWO OCCASIONS? 
A I REMEMBER THIS ONE. 
Q YOU ARE REFERRING TO THE LAST OCCASION IN 
NOVEMBER OF 1984? 
A YES. I REMEMBER THAT ONE. 
Q DO YOU HAVE A MEMORY OF GOING THERE AND 
PERFORMING WORK ON THE EARLIER OCCASION? 
A 1 DON'T REALLY RECALL THAT ONE, NO. 
Q DO YOU HAVE ANY REASON TO QUARREL WITH THE 
ACCURACY OF THE REPORTS, HOWEVER? 
A NO. I COULD HAVE BEEN THERE. 1 JUST 
COULDN'T REALLY TELL YOU WHAT I WOULD HAVE DONE. IT 
LOOKS LIKE IT MUST HAVE HAD A SHORT IN IT OR 
SOMETHING. 
Q I TAKE IT THAT YOU CO REPAIRS OF SO MANY 
SIGNS THAT SOMETIMES IT'S HARD TO REMEMBER 
INDIVIDUAL --

































A YES. I HAVE DONE A LOT OF REPAIR WORK, 
WIRING ON DIFFERENT SIGNS. 
Q WHAT DO YOU REMEMBER ABOUT THE INCIDENT 
REFLECTED BY EXHI5IT 38? LET ME POINT OUT TO YOU 
ThAT THE SERVICE ORDER IS DATED OCTOBER 31, AND IT 
APPEARS THE WORK WAS DONE ON NOVEMBER 12. SO WITH 
THAT PREFACE, THE QUESTION IS, WHAT DO YOU RECALL 
ABOUT WHAT YOU DID? 
A 1 INSTALLED TV/0 BALLASTS. 
Q WHO WORKED WITH YOU? 
A ERIC JACOBS. 
Q HOW WAS IT THAT YOU WERE ALERTED TO GO TO 
THE STORE AND DO THAT WORK? 
A WELL, EACH MORNING TrEY LINE US UP WITH 
WHAT WORK NEEDS TC BE DONE, AND THIS IS ONE OF THE 
WORK ORDERS THEY GAVE ME TO DO. SO WE JUST DC IT. 
Q DO YOU KNOW HOW IT WAS THAT A PROBLEM HAD 
BEEN IDENTIFIED PRIOR TO GIVING YOU THE WORK ORDER? 
A YES. WE HAVE A NIGHT PATROL, AND IT WAS 
PICKED UP BY NIGHT PATROL THAT THERE WAS OUTAGE IN 
THE SIGN. 
Q THAT IS, SOMETHING THAT SHOULD HAVE BEEN 
LIT UP WASN'T LIT UP? 
A RIGHT. 
Q YOU WERE SENT OUT TO FIND OUT WHY AND FIX 
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JERRY D FENN 
JOHN R LUND 
BRUCE R GARNER 
CHRISTOPHER C FULLER 
LAW OFFICES 
SNOW, C H R I S T E N S E N & MARTIXEAU 
IO EXCHANGE PLACE. ELEVENTH FLOOR 
POST OFFICE BOX 3 0 0 0 
SALT LAKE CITY, U T A H 8 4 1 1 0 
TELEPHONE (SOI) 521-9000 
TELECOPIER (SOU 3 6 3 - 0 4 0 0 
August 26, 1985 
THURMAN & SUTHERLAND 1686 
THLRMAN SJ'^EGLAND & KING tees 
T H U R M A N WEDGV*CCD & IRVINE 1906 
IRV INE S«EEM & 'r>jRMAN , 9 2 3 
5KEEN THURMAN WORSuEY £ SNOW 195? 
WORSLEY SNOW & CHRISTENSEN 195? 
JOHN H SNOW I9I7- I98C 
OF COUNSEL 
JOSEPH NOVAK 
GEORGE N LAPSEN 
WRITERS DIRECT NUMBER 
Mr. Gary D. Stott 
Richards, Brandt, Miller & 
Nelson 
50 South Main, 7th Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110 
Re: Toshiko Pickhover, et al. v. Smith's Management 
Corporation, et al., Civil No. C85-4307. 
Dear Mr. Stott: 
On August 28, 1981, Marveon Sign Company and Young 
Electric Sign Company entered into a Purchase Agreement, 
a copy of which is enclosed. 
By Section 2.a of that Purchase Agreement, Young 
Electric Sign Company agreed to "to provide...insurance 
coverage adequate to fully protect (Marveon Sign Company) 
against...personal injury or death claims arising out of 
the ownership, maintenance, use, service, transportation, 
or installation of Displays in a minimum amount of $1,000,000 
Marveon Sign Company hereby tenders the defense of 
Marveon Sign Company in Civil No. C85-4307 to Young Electric 
Sign Company and Young Electric Sign Company's insurers. 
Very truly yours, 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
. /^ W^ u^ ,—* 
Robert H. Henderson 
RHH/yc 
Encl. 




RICHARDS, BRANDT, MILLER & NELSON 
A PROFESSIONAL LAW CORPORATION 
C S B TOWER - 5 0 S O U T H MAIN - SLHTE 7 0 0 
PO BOX 2 4 6 5 
SALT LAKE CITY UTAH 8 « " 0 
JOHN L YOUNG 
DAVID K LAURiTZCN 
LYNN S DAVIES 
WILLIAM S RICHARDS PC 
ROBERT w BRANDT 
P KEITH NELSON 
M KENT CHRISTOPHERSON ROBERT G GILCHRIST 
GARY D STOTT MICHAEL E D Y E R 
GARY B FERGUSON RUSSELL C FERlCKS 
ROBERT L STEVENS MICHAEL K MOHRMAN 
NELSON L HAYES MICHAEL P Z A C C H E O 
DAVID L BARCLAY GARY L JOHNSON 
ROBERT w MILLER 
(I9UO-1983) 
TELEPHONE 
(SOD 531-17 7 7 
September 13, 1985 
Robert H. Henderson, Esq. 
Snow, Christensen & Martineau 
10 Exchange Place, 11th Floor 
Post Office Box 3000 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110 
Re: Pickhover vs. Smith's Management 
& Young Electric 
Our File No.: 26049-136 
Dear Mr. Henderson: 
I have discussed your tender of defense request with 
my clients. It is our opinion based upon the contract 
between Marveon Sign and Young Electric Sign that the 
acceptance of defense must be denied. 
If you believe this contract provides otherwise, 
I would be happy to discuss it with you. 
Sincerely, 
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CORPORATION, et al., 
Defendants. 
DEFENDANT YOUNG ELECTRICS 
MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION 
TO DEFENDANT MARVEON'S 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT 
Civil No. C85-4307 
Judge Scott Daniels 
oooOooo 
Defendant Young Electric Company hereby submits the 
following Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Opposition to 
Defendant Marveon's Motion for Summary Judgment. 
FACTS 
For the purposes of this Motion, Young Electric Sign 
Company (hereinafter "YESCO") takes no issue with Marveon's 
Statement of Undisputed Facts, with the exception of the 
following additions: 
* r> A 
1. At paragraph 3, Marveon states that the 
Purchase Agreement between Marveon and YESCO 
provides that YESCO would "provide, at its expense, 
insurance coverage adequate to fully protect 
[Marveon] against . . . personal injury or death 
claims arising out of the ownership, maintenance, 
use, service, transportation or installation of 
displays in a minimum amount of One Million Dollars 
($1,000,000)." YESCO would add that the Purchase 
Agreement also states "Buyer assumes no liabilities 
or obligations of Seller except as specifically 
described and set forth herein." (Purchase 
Agreement, Section 2.b. at p. 3.) 
2. The Purchase Agreement also states that: 
"From the date hereof to and including the Closing 
Date, the Seller will not enter into any such 
contract or contracts without the prior written 
consent of Buyer. The Seller [Marveon] has 
performed in all material respects all obligations 
required to be performed by it to the date hereof and 
is not in default in any material respect under any 
agreements, leases, or other documents to which it is 
party and to which Buyer is succeeding or assuming 
obligations hereunder." (Purchase Agreement, Section 
[No. 20]c. at p. 13.) 
3. Between August 1981, and January, 1985, 
YESCO was not the only company to perform 
-2-
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maintenance on the sign. During that period, 
maintenance was also performed by the defendant Image 
National, Inc. 
ARGUMENT 
Marveon has argued two separate points in its 
Motion for Summary Judgment. First, Marveon argues that 
"YESCO agreed to fully protect Marveon against personal 
injury or death claims . . . " and is thus entitled to summary 
judgment. Second, Marveon requests attorneys1 fees. Neither 
of Marveon!s arguments are supported by the facts or the 
law. Both points, for example, are totally devoid of citation 
to either statutory or judicial authority. After careful 
reading of the Purchase Agreement, it is difficult to see how 
Marveon can expect full protection from personal injury or 
death claims when no mention is made in the Purchase Agreement 
of YESCO agreeing to assume liability for Marveonfs past 
negligence. This is especially true in light of Marveonfs 
warranty to YESCO in the Purchase Agreement that any 
contracts entered into before the closing date were not in 
default in any material respect. Further, Utah case law 




A FACTUAL QUESTION EXISTS WHETHER YESCO AGREED 
TO FULLY PROTECT MARVEON AGAINST PERSONAL 
INJURY OR DEATH CLAIMS IN A MINIMUM AMOUNT OF 
ONE MILLION DOLLARS FOR THE NEGLIGENCE OF 
MARVEON PRIOR TO THE DATE OF THE PURCHASE AGREEMENT. 
Marveon argues that Section 2.a. of the Purchase 
Agreement is unambiguous in requiring YESCO to provide 
insurance coverage adequate to fully protect Marveon against 
personal injury or death claims arising out of the ownership, 
maintenance, use, service, or installation of signs up to the 
minimum amount of One Million Dollars. YESCO maintains that 
this language is anything but unambiguous and that it was 
Marveon's negligence that brought about this litigation. The 
Utah Supreme Court has applied a strict interpretation standard 
when interpreting indemnity provisions similar to this. The 
court's standard in interpreting indemnity provisions 
purporting to indemnify the indemnitee for its own negligence 
is set forth in Union Pacific Railroad Co. v. El Paso Natural 
Gas Co., 408 P.2d 910, 914 (1965) as follows: 
The majority rule appears to be that in 
most situations, where such is the desire 
of the parties, and it is clearly 
understood and expressed, such a covenant 
will be upheld. But the presumption is 
against any such intention, and it is not 
achieved by inference or implication from 
general language such as employed here. It 
will be regarded as a binding contractual 
obligation only when that intention is 
clearly and unequivocally expressed. 
Clearly, the general language used in this indemnity provision 
-4-
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would not rebut the presumption against any intention by 
YESCO to indemnify Marveon for its own negligence. 
YESCO maintains that in entering into the Purchase 
Agreement with Marveon, it never intended to assume any 
liability for Marveon's past negligent acts. As support for 
this contention, YESCO invites the court's attention to 
Section [20] of the Purchase Agreement entitled 
"Representations, Warranties and Covenants of the Seller, on p. 
12 and 13. Particularly, subparagraph c states in pertinent 
part as follows: 
The Seller has performed in all material 
respects all obligations required to be 
performed by it to the date hereof and is 
not in default in any material respect 
under any agreements, leases, or other 
documents to which it is a party and to 
which Buyer is succeeding or assuming 
obligations hereunder. 
This language clearly indicates that YESCO was relying on 
Marveonfs representation that past contracts had been 
performed in all material respects and that Marveon was not 
in default in any material respect under any of those 
contracts. Had Marveon not made such guarantees, YESCO 
would have never agreed to provide insurance coverage adequate 
to fully protect Marveon against property damage or personal 
injury or death claims arising out of the ownership, 
maintenance, use, service, transportation or installation of 
displays in a minimum amount of One Million Dollars. YESCO 
asserts and intends to show at the trial that Marveonfs 
negligence in putting up the sign was the cause of the accident 
that is the subject of this litigation. That negligence 
-5-
resulted in a breach of contract on Marveon's part with 
Smith's and consequently with YESCO. Because of that breach 
of contract, the language in the Purchase Agreement 
representing the indemnity provision no longer applies. 
Assuming, arguendo, that the contract was not 
breached, the language of the indemnity provision is not 
specific enough to impose upon YESCO liability for the 
negligent acts of Marveon. This contention finds continued 
support from the language of the Utah Supreme Court in Union 
Pacific Railroad Co, v. El Paso Natural Gas Co., 408 P.2d 910 
(1965): 
If it had been the intent of the parties 
that the defendant should indemnify the 
plaintiff even after the latter1s 
negligent acts, it would have been easy 
enough to use that very language and to 
thus make that intent clear and 
unmistakable, which was not done here. 
Id. at 914. The Utah Supreme Court has held language much 
more specific than the case at bar does not constitute clear 
and unequivocal expression of the intentions of the indemnitor 
to indemnify the indemnitee for the indemnitee's negligent 
acts. In Howe Rents Corp. v. Worthen, 420 P.2d 848, 849 
(1966) the language "shall be liable for all damage or loss of 
equipment regardless of cause" was held not clear enough to 
support indemnification when the indemnitee was negligent. 
YESCO never intended to assume liability for 
Marveon's past negligent acts. Had YESCO intended to 
assume such liability, it would not have required from 
Marveon a warranty that Marveon was not in default in any 
-6-
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material respect under its past contracts. YESCO would have 
also had their assumption of liability clearly spelled out in 
the indemnity provision. Such was clearly not the intention of 
YESCO, and Marveon should not now be allowed to profit from 
its own negligent acts. There is a presumption against 
allowing Marveon to insure itself against its own negligent 
acts. Freund v. Utah Power & Light, 625 F. Supp. 272, 280 
(D. Utah 1985). The presumption in this case cannot be 
overcome. 
POINT II 
MARVEON SHOULD NOT BE ALLOWED COSTS AND 
ATTORNEY'S FEES IN ITS MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT. 
YESCO argues that because it is not required to 
fully protect Marveon against personal injury or death claims 
when Marveonfs own negligence is the cause of those claims, 
YESCO should not be required to pay Marveon's costs and 
attorney's fees in a claim of this kind against YESCO. 
YESCO is under no duty to indemnify Marveon for its 
negligence. Such a lack of a duty would also apply to any 
request for indemnification for costs and attorney's fees in 
this cause of action. 
CONCLUSION 
There are many disputed factual matters in 
Marveon's Motion to this Court for Summary Judgment. In 
addition, both points in Marveon's Memorandum in Support of 
Its Motion for Summary Judgment are clearly not supported by 
-7-
the law of this jurisdiction. The language in the indemnity 
provision is ambiguous and a significant question of fact 
exists as to which party's negligence is the cause of this 
litigation. The langauge of the Purchase Agreement supports 
YESCO's contention that it did not agree to indemnify Marveon 
for Marveonfs negligent acts. For these reasons, and based 
on the arguments developed above, YESCO respectfully requests 
this Court to deny Marveonfs Motion for Summary Judgment on 
all issues presented. 







I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of 
the foregoing instrument was mailed/ fiirst^-class, postage 
prepaid on this ^ X day of / ^ /fry*V^ 1986, to the 
following counsel of record: Cx 
PICKH0V1/MMW 
Van Wagoner & Stevens 
Mark 0. Van Wagoner 
Lewis T. Stevens 
Phyllis J. Walton 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
Suite 550 
185 South State Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Roger H. Bullock 
Strong & Hanni 
Attorney for Defendants 
Smith's Management Corpor 
Smith's Food King Properties 
Sixth Floor Boston Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Paul H. Matthews 
Hanson, Dunn, Epperson & Smith 
650 Clark Learning Office Center 
175 South West Temple 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Paul S. Felt 
Ray, Quinney & Nebeker 
400 Deseret Building 
79 South Main Street 
P.O. Box 45385 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84134 
Robert H. Henderson 
Snow, Christensen & Martineau 
P.O. Box 3000 
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ROBERT H. HENDERSON (A14 61) 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
Attorneys for Marveon, Inc. 
10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor 
Post Office Box 45000 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145 
Telephone: (801) 521-9000 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
TOSHIKO PICKHOVER, an indi-
vidual and personal repre-
sentative of the Estate of 
John W. Pickhover; CATHERINE 
PICKHOVER, an individual; 




SMITHS MANAGEMENT CORPORATION, 
a Utah corporation; SMITH'S 
FOOD KING PROPERTIES, a Utah 
corporation, DEE'S, INC., a 
Utah corporation; YOUNG 
ELECTRIC SIGN COMPANY, a Utah 
corporation; MARVEON, INC., a 
Utah corporation; and IMAGE 
NATIONAL, INC., an Idaho 
corporation, 
Defendants. 
DEFENDANT MARVEON, INC.'S 
REPLY MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT 
OF MARVEON*S MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT AGAINST 
DEFENDANT YOUNG ELECTRIC 
Civil No. C85-4307 
Honorable Scott Daniels 
..-*. *-». *-* 
POINT I 
THE PURCHASE AGREEMENT BETWEEN MARVEON AND 
YESCO MUST BE READ AS A WHOLE—YESCO'S ARGU-
MENTS WOULD EFFECTIVELY WRITE PARAGRAPH 2.a., 
THE PARAGRAPH WHEREBY YESCO AGREED TO PROVIDE 
INSURANCE ADEQUATE TO FULLY PROTECT MARVEON, 
RIGHT OUT OF THE PURCHASE AGREEMENT. 
Yesco claims that the language in paragraph 20.c. of the 
Purchase Agreement that Marveon "has performed in all material 
respects all obligations . . . and is not in default in any-
material respect" somehow voids the promise in paragraph 2.a. 
to provide insurance coverage adequate to fully protect 
Marveon. Such a construction effectively writes paragraph 2.a. 
out of the Purchase Agreement. If, as Yesco argues, a personal 
injury or death arising out of a sign Marveon had installed 
meant that Marveon had not fully performed in all material 
respects, or that Marveon was somehow in default in a material 
respect, there could be no possible circumstances that could 
ever arise that would give any meaning to the provision of 
paragraph 2.a. whereby Yesco agreed to provide insurance 
coverage adequate to fully protect Marveon. If no injury or 
death, there is no need for insurance; but, according to Yesco, 
if there ever is an injury or death, Marveon has not performed 
and is in default, thus voiding paragraph 2.a. 
Yesco claims that without the representation that Marveon 
had performed and was not in default, that Yesco would never 
-2-
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have agreed to provide the insurance coverage adequate to fully 
protect Marveon. Again, however, the argument fails 
logically. Had Marveon and Yesco known that no one would ever 
file a suit against Marveon, there would have been no reason 
for paragraph 2.a. The only way the two provisions of the 
Purchase Agreement can be interpreted harmoniously is that as 
far as Marveon knew at the time of the Purchase Agreement, 
Marveon had performed in all material respects and was not in 
default in any material respect. There is no evidence, and no 
claim has been made, that as of the time of the Purchase 
Agreement that Marveon knew of any problem with the sign out of 
which this lawsuit arises. 
Even more fundamentally, paragraph 20 is simply not appli-
cable to this case. Paragraph 20 clearly refers to "contracts" 
and "defaults." Paragraph 20.c. states: "Except as provided 
in Schedule L, [Marveon] is not a party to any contract 
adversely affecting assets being purchased or contracts being 
assumed." The language Yesco relies on is simply language 
clarifying and explaining this introductory sentence to para-
graph 20.c. Paragraph 20 does not refer to personal injury 
lawsuits or deaths. Paragraph 2.a. is the paragraph that 
addresses personal injuries, deaths, and lawsuits arising 




ALL OTHER UTAH INDEMNIFICATION CASES ARE 
DIFFERENT THAN THIS CASE. ALL OTHER CASES 
AROSE EITHER IN THE CONTEXT OF AN EMPLOYER 
LOSING THE EXCLUSIVE REMEDY PROVISION OF 
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION IF THE INDEMNIFICA-
TION AGREEMENT WERE UPHELD, OR CASES WHERE 
THE INDEMNITEE TOOK ADVANTAGE OF GREAT DIS-
PARITY IN ECONOMIC POWER TO FORCE THE 
INDEMNITOR INTO THE INDEMNIFICATION AGREE-
MENT IN THE FIRST PLACE. 
Yesco agreed to provide insurance coverage adequate to 
fully protect Marveon. Marveon was going out of business and 
Marveon was selling its assets to Yesco. This was an arm's 
length transaction where both parties knew Marveon would never 
again have any control over the signs. Paragraph 2.a. could 
not apply to anyone other than Marveon, and could not apply to 
any negligence other than Marveon's negligence. Marveon needed 
no provision to protect Marveon against Yesco's negligence. 
Marveon could not be sued for Yesco's negligence. Marveon was 
going out of business, Marveon wanted to be protected from 
future lawsuits, and thus the provisions of paragraph 2.a. 
whereby Yesco agreed to provide, at its expense, insurance 
coverage adequate to fully protect Marveon. 
This case is different from all other Utah indemnification 
cases. Here there is no employer about to lose the exclusive 
remedy of workmen's compensation. Here there is no party with 
little or no bargaining power forced to enter into an adhesion 
-4-
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contract including an indemnification agreement to get the use 
of the product, or to be employed as a subcontractor, etc. In 
this case, there was an arm's length transaction wherein it 
made great business sense for Yesco, who was forever after to 
control and maintain the sign, to protect Marveon with 
insurance for future lawsuits. 
CONCLUSION 
Assuming Yesco1s best case, that Marveon*s negligence was 
the sole proximate cause of the accident sued upon, Marveon is 
nevertheless entitled to judgment against Yesco, based on para-
graph 2.a. of the Purchase Agreement, that, to the extent any 
judgment is entered against Marveon, Marveon is entitled to a 
judgment over against Yesco to the full amount of any such 
judgment up to the amount of $1,000,000. 
DATED this day of October, 1986. 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
R^ lbert H. Henderson 
Attorneys for Marveon 
SCM2049H 
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MAILING CERTIFICATE 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
:ss. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
DONNA CAMPBELL, being duly sworn, states that she is employed 
in the offices of Snow, Chris tensen & Martineau, attorneys for 
Marveon Sign, Inc. and that she served a copy of 
Defendant Marveon, Inc.'s Reply Memorandum in Support of Marvpnn's 
Motion for Summary Judgment Against Defendant Young Electric 
upon the following parties: 
Mark 0, Van Wagoner 
VAN WAGONER & STEVENS 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
185 So. State St., Suite 550 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Roger H. Bullock 
STRONG & HANNI 
6th Floor, Boston Bldg. 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorneys for Smiths 
Paul H. Matthews 
HANSON & DUNN 
Attorneys for Image 
175 South West Temple 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Gary D. Stott 
RICHARDS, BRANDT, MILLER 
& NELSON 
50 South Main, 7th Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84144 
Attorneys for Young Electric 
Paul S. Felt 
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER 
P.O. Box 3850 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110 
Attorneys for Dee f s, Inc. 
by placing a true copy thereof in an envelope and mailing the same, 
postage prepaid, on the 29th day of October , 1986. 
Secretary 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO BEFORE me this 29th day of October 
1986. 
5/13/89 
My Commission Expires 





ROBERT H. HENDERSON \ ^ A 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTON^AU 
A t t o r n e y s f o r Marveon Sigpi^ompany 
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S a l t Lake C i t y , Utah 84145 
T e l e p h o n e : (801) 521-9000 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 




CORPORATION, et al., 
Defendants. 
ORDER AND JUDGMENT 
Civil No. C85-4307 
Judge Scott Daniels 
Defendant, Marveon, Inc.'s (Marveon) Motion for Summary 
Judgment Against Defendant Young Electric Sign Company (YESCO) 
came on regularly for Hearing before The Honorable Scott Daniels 
at the Law and Motion calendar at 10:00 a.m. on October 31, 1986. 
Each party was represented by counsel. The Court heard the 
arguments of Robert H. Henderson of the law firm Snow, Christensen 
& Martineau on behalf of Marveon and Michael K. Mohrman of the 
law firm Richards, Brandt, Miller & Nelson on behalf of YESCO. 
The Court fully reviewed the Memoranda on file and the Court 
was fully advised. 
The Court concludes that in the event any judgment is 
returned in favor of plaintiffs and against Marveon, that 
Marveon is entitled to be indemnified by YESCO for the full 
amount of any such judgment up to $1,000,000 and that YESCO 
be required to pay Marveonfs costs and attorneys1 fees from 
and after the date of the tender of the defense of Marveon 
to YESCO. 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED: 
That Marveonfs Motion for Summary Judgment Against 
YESCO be, and hereby is granted. 
Based thereon, NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED, ADJUDGED 
AND DECREED THAT: 
Judgment be, and hereby is entered in favor of Marveon 
and against YESCO that in the event any judgment is returned 
in favor of plaintiffs and against Marveon that Marveon is 
entitled to be indemnified by YESCO for the full amount of 
any such judgment up to $1,000,000, and that YESCO pay Marveon's 
costs and attorneys' fees from and after the date of the tender 
of defense of Marveon to YESCO. 
DATED this ) 0 day of November, 1986. 
BY THE COURT: 
SCOTT DANIELS 
District Court Judge 
ATTEST
 c 
- 2 - H. DiXCN HWOLEY ^ f Y * - ^ 
AFFIDAVIT OF SERVICE 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
:ss. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
Donna Campbell, being sworn, says that she is 
employed in the law offices of Snow, Christensen & Martineau, 
attorneys for Marveon Sign, Inc., that she served the attached 
Order and Judgment upon the following parties by hand delivery 
to on the 31st day of October, 1986: 
Mark 0. Van Wagoner 
VAN WAGONER & STEVENS 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
185 South State St., Ste. 550 
Salt Lake City, Utah 8 4111 
Roger H. Bullock 
STRONG & HANNI 
6th Floor, Boston Bldg. 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorneys for Smiths 
Paul H. Matthews 
HANSON & DUNN 
Attorneys for Image 
175 South West Temple 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Gary D. Stott 
RICHARDS, BRANDT, MILLER 
& NELSON 
50 South Main, 7th Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84144 
Attorneys for Young Electric 
Paul S. Felt 
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER 
P.O. Box 3850 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110 
Attorneys for Dee's, Inc. 
f c r e t a r y 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN t o b e f o r e me t h i s yl — 
O c t o b e r , 1986 . 
day of 
My Commission Expires: 
VKMAT^ 
JOTAM PUBLIC 
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H Dixpffi h ind . ; , £ s >} 
By M\t n £tGr£,L~ 
GARY D. STOTT [A313 0] 
MICHAEL K. MOHRMAN [A409£tl 
RICHARDS, BRANDT, MILLER 
& NELSON 
Attorneys for Defendant ^ oung Electric Sign Company 
CSB Tower, Suite 700 
50 South Main Street 
P.O. Box 2465 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110 
Telephone: (801) 531-1777 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
TOSHIKO PICKHOVER, an individ-
ual and personal representa-
tive of the Estate of John W. 
Pickhover; CATHERINE PICKHOVER, 
an individual; and GLORIA 
PICKHOVER, an individual, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
SMITH'S MANAGEMENT CORPORATION, 
a Utah corporation; SMITH'S 
FOOD KING PROPERTIES, A Utah 
corporation; DEEfS, INC., 
a Utah corporation; YOUNG 
ELECTRIC SIGN COMPANY, a Utah 
corporation; MARVEON, INC., 
a Utah corporation; and IMAGE 
NATIONAL, INC., an Idaho 
corporation, 
Defendants. 
CERTIFICATION OF SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT AS FINAL ORDER 
Civil No. C85-4307 
On the 20th day of November, 1986, the defendant, 
Young Electric Sign Company, by and through its counsel of 
record, Michael K. Mohrman, appeared before the District Court of 
the Third Judicial District in and for Salt Lake County, State of 
Utah and requested the Court to certify as a final order, the 
Summary Judgment previously granted in favor of Marveon as 
against Young Electric Sign Company (YESCO). The Court finds 
that the Summary Judgment in favor of Marveon and against Young 
Electric Sign Company is a final order on an entire claim. The 
Court specifically finds that this claim could be appealed while 
the remainder of the case continues to be litigated and finds 
that there is no just reason for delay with regard to this matter, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Summary Judgment granted 
! in favor of Marveon as against Young Electric Sign Company is a 
final order and is certified as such for immediate appeal 
pursuant to Rule 54(b) of Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
DATED this Qu day of Decemberf 1986. 
BY THE COURT 
St rifa^Usjd^ 
HONORABLE SCOTT DANIELS 
District Court Judge 
ATTEST 
H. DIXON HNCLEY 
DwwVC" ^ 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy 
of the foregoing document by first-class mail, postage prepaid, 
this /<?**" day of December, 1986, to: 
Van Wagoner & Stevens 
Mark 0. Van Wagoner 
Lewis T. Stevens 
Phyllis J. Walton 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
Suite 550 
185 South State Street 
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C/3 
Roger H. Bullock 
Strong & Hanni 
Attorney for Defendants 
Smith's Management Corpor 
Smith's Food King Properties 
Sixth Floor Boston Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Paul H. Matthews 
Hanson, Dunn, Epperson & Smith 
650 Clark Learning Office Center 
175 South West Temple 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Paul S. Felt 
Ray, Quinney & Nebeker 
400 Deseret Building 
79 South Main Street 
P.O. Box 45385 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84134 
4all36 
Robert H. Henderson 
Snow, Christensen & Martineau 
P.O. Box 45000 
S a l t Lak^ C i t y , UT 84145 
*4l?rjL# Ji 
— *5 — nt\i\*~ r> 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that four copies of the Respondent's Brief 
have been served by mail on each party or his counsel by 
mailing, first class, postage prepaid, on this day of 
, 1987, to the following counsel of record: 
Mark 0. Van Wagoner 
VAN WAGONER & STEVENS 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
215 South State St., Suite 500 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Roger H. Bullock 
STRONG & HANNI 
6th Floor, Boston Bldg. 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorneys for Smiths 
Paul H. Matthews 
HANSON, DUNN, EPPERSON 8. SMITH 
175 South West Temple 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Michael S. Mohrman 
RICHARDS, BRANDT, MILLER 
& NELSON 
50 South Main, 7th Floor 
P.O. Box 2465 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110 
Attorneys for Young Electric 
Paul S. Felt 
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER 
P.O. Box 3850 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110 
Attorneys for Dee's, Inc. 
DATED this day of , 1987 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
By 
Robert H. Henderson 
Attorneys for Marveon 
SCMRHH138 
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
TOSHIKO PICKHOVER, an * 
individual and personal * 
representative of the Estate * 
of John W. Pickhover; CATHERINE * 
PICKHOVER, an individual and * 






SMITH'S MANAGEMENT CORPORATION, * Civil No. 880193-CA 
A Utah corporation; SMITH'S * 
FOOD KING PROPERTIES, a Utah * 
corporation; YOUNG ELECTRIC * Case No. 
SIGN COMPANY (Appellant); * 
MARVEON, INC. (Respondent) ; * 
and IMAGE NATIONAL, INC., an * 
Idaho corporation, * 
* 
Defendants. * 
EX PARTE REQUEST AND ORDER FOR EXTENSION OF 
TIME TO FILE PETITION FOR CERTIORARI 
An Appeal from the Amended Opinion of the 
Utah Court of Appeals dated April 11, 1989. 
ROBERT H. HENDERSON 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
10 Exchange Place, 11th Floor 
P.O. Box 45000 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145 
Telephone: (801) 521-9000 
Attorneys for Respondent 
MICHAEL K. MOHRMAN 
RICHARDS, BRANDT, MILLER & 
NELSON 
Key Bank Tower, Suite 700 
50 South Main Street 
P.O. Box 2465 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110 
Telephone: (801) 531-1777 
Attorneys for Appellant/ 
Petitioner 
COMES NOW the defendant and petitioner Young Electric 
Sign Company pursuant to Rule 45(e) Rules of the Utah Supreme 
Court and requests this Court for an order extending the time 
to file its Petition for Certiorari to and including June 12, 
1989. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this // day of May, 1989. 
RICHARDS, BRANDT, MILLER 
& NELSON 
MICHAEL K. MOHRMAN / 
•"ATtorneys for YESCO / 
/ / 
ORDER 
Pursuant to Rule 45(e) Rules of the Utah Supreme 
Court and pursuant to the ex parte request of petitioner Young 
Electric Sign Company, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Young Electric Sign Company 
may have to and including June 12, 1989 to file its Petition 
for Certiorari. 
DATED this day of , 1989. 
BY THE COURT: 
JUSTICE, UTAH SUPREME COURT 
- 2 -
CERTIFICATE OF HAND DELIVERY 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing instrument was hand delivered on this I fa day of 
May, 1989, to the following counsel of record: 
Robert H. Henderson 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
10 Exchange Place, 11th Floor 
P.O. Box 45000 






GARY D. STOTT [A3130] 
MICHAEL K. MOHRMAN [A4094] 
RICHARDS, BRANDT, MILLER 
& NELSON 
Attorneys for Defendant Young Electric Sign Company 
CSB Tower, Suite 700 
50 South Main Street 
P.O. Box 2465 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110 
Telephone: (801) 531-1777 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
TOSHIKO PICKHOVER, an individ-
ual and personal representa-
tive of the Estate of John W. 
Pickhover; CATHERINE PICKHOVER, 
an individual; and GLORIA 
PICKHOVER, an individual, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
SMITH'S MANAGEMENT CORPORATION, 
a Utah corporation; SMITH'S 
FOOD KING PROPERTIES, A Utah 
corporation; DEE'S, INC., 
a Utah corporation; YOUNG 
ELECTRIC SIGN COMPANY (Appellant) 
MARVEON, INC.(Respondent); and 




Jurisdiction to hear the above entitled appeal is 
conferred in the Utah Supreme Court, pursuant to Rule 3(a) and 
Rule 54(b) Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. Specifically, 
the trial court directed that the Order was a final judgment as 
DOCKETING STATEMENT 
Case No. tiJ W6Q 
to one of the claims and as to only two of the parties, but there 
was no just reason for delay as to the determination of the 
issues presented. 
NATURE OF PROCEEDING 
This appeal is to reverse a decision of the Third 
Judicial District Court, Judge Scott Daniels presiding, granting 
the Motion for Partial Summary Judgment of Marveon, Inc. 
against the defendant and appellant, Young Electric Sign Company. 
DATE OF JUDGMENT 
The court originally rendered its decision on October 
31, 1986; however, the court did not certify the Summary Judgment 
as a final order pursuant to Rule 54(b) Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure until January 2, 1987. Notice of Appeal was filed on 
February 2, 1987 and an Order for Extension of Time to File 
Docketing Statement was granted on the 23rd day of February, 
1987. The Order gave the appellant until March 5, 1987 to file 
the Docketing Statement. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
This appeal arises out of a wrongful death action filed 
by the survivors of John W. Pickhover. On July 5, 1985 a sign 
fell off of a side of a Smith's Food King located at 
approximately 94th South in Sandy, Utah. The sign struck and 
killed the plaintiffs1 decedent, John Pickhover. It is 
undisputed that the sign had been installed by the defendant 
Marveon Sign Company (hereinafter Marveon) some time in 
1978. Subsequent to that time in August of 1981, another 
defendant, Young Electric Sign Company (hereinafter YESCO) 
2 
negotiated for and bought the assets of Marveon. Among the 
assets purchased by YESCO were the maintenance contracts, 
including a maintenance contract for the Smithfs Food King 
located in Sandy. A Purchase Agreement between Marveon and 
YESCO was subsequently drafted which provided in part that 
YESCO would "provide, at its expense, insurance coverage 
adequate to fully protect ]Marveon[ against . . . personal 
injury or death claims arising out of the ownership, maintenance, 
use, service, transportation or installation of displays in a 
minimum amount of One Million Dollars ($1,000,000)." After the 
institution of the suit by the plaintiffs against the defendants 
in the above-captioned matter, the defendant Marveon filed a 
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment against the defendant 
YESCO. Essentially, Marveon's Motion for Summary Judgment 
requested that to the extent that the plaintiffs obtained any 
judgment against Marveon, YESCO should be required to 
indemnify Marveon for the full extent of any judgment up to One 
Million Dollars ($1,000,000). 
Subsequently, the defendant YESCO filed a Memorandum 
in Opposition to the defendant Marveon's Motion for Summary 
Judgment arguing that the language relied upon by Marveon in 
the Purchase Agreement was not sufficient to support Summary 
Judgment. The District Court, the Honorable Scott Daniels 
presiding, granted the Motion for Summary Judgment in favor of 
Marveon and subsequently certified the Summary Judgment as a 
Final Order. This appeal ensued. 
ISSUE FOR REVIEW 
The defendant Young Electric Sign Company brings the 
following issue for review in this appeal: 
1. Whether the language of the Purchase Agreement 
cited by the defendant Marveon in its Motion for Summary 
Judgment is sufficient to require the defendant YESCO to 
indemnify and/or insure Marveon for its own negligence. 
CASES 
The defendant Young Electric Sign Company will rely on 
the following cases, among others, in support of its appeal: 
Kennecott Copper Corp. v. General Motors Corp., 730 F.2d 1380 
(10th Cir. 1984); Union Pacific Railroad v. Intermountain 
Farmers Association, 568 P.2d 724 (1977); Union Pacific Co. v. 
El Paso Natural Gas Co., 17 Utah.2d 255, 408 P.2d 910 (1965), 
Howe Rents Corp. v. Worthen, 420 P.2d 848 (1966) and 
Freund v. Utah Power and Light, 625 F. Supp. 272 (D. Utah 
1985) and Shell Oil Co. v. Brinkerhoff Signal Drilling Co., 
658 P.2d 1187 (Utah 1983). 
PRIOR APPEALS 
There have been no related or prior appeals in this 
4 
particular case. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this C$ -~ day of March, 1987, 
RICHARDS, BRANDT, MILIAR 
& NE&SON 
Attorney for Appelaant 
-^ -¥oung Electric Sijgn Cuiupany 
CERTIFICATE QF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy 
of the foregoing Docketing Statement was mailed, this 5^— day 
of March, 1987, to: 
Van Wagoner & Stevens 
Mark 0. Van Wagoner 
Lewis T. Stevens 
Phyllis J. Walton 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
Suite 550 
185 South State Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Roger H. Bullock 
Strong & Hanni 
Attorney for Defendants 
Smith's Management Corpor 
Smith's Food King Properties 
Sixth Floor Boston Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Paul H. Matthews 
Hanson, Dunn, Epperson & Smith 
650 Clark Learning Office Center 
175 South West Temple 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Paul S. Felt 
Ray, Quinney & Nebeker 
400 Deseret Building 
79 South Main Street 
P.O. Box 45385 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84134 
Robert H. Henderson 
Snow, Christensen & Martineau 
P.O. Box 45000 // 
Salt Lake City, UT 84145 / / 
4all36 
- A -
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that four copies of Marveon's Brief 
in Opposition to Petition for Writ of Certiorari have been 
served by mail on each party or his counsel by mailing, first 
class, postage prepaid, on this 26th day of June, 1989, to 
the following counsel of record: 
Michael S. Mohrman 
RICHARD, BRANDT, MILLER 
& NELSON 
Attorneys for Young Electric 
Key Bank Tower, Suite 700 
50 South Main Street 
P.O. Box 2465 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110 
DATED this lAj? day of June, 1989 W 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
Robert H. Henderson 
Attorneys for Marveon 
